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1.1.   Motivation 
The aggressive tax avoidance of some multinational enterprises (MNEs) has 
received much attention recently. The debate has been stimulated by very low reported 
effective tax rates (ETRs). In 2010, for example, large profitable U.S. corporations 
disclosed on average an ETR of 16.9 %, although with 35 % they face one of the highest 
official statutory tax rates in the world (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013). 
Google Inc. was even able to reduce its overseas ETR to 2.4 %.
1
 
In 2013, as a response to this tax avoidance behavior, the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) proposed an action plan against base 
erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS) activities of MNEs. This action plan consists of 15 
specific action items that are intended to ‘better align rights to tax with economic 
activities’ (OECD, 2013).  
However, although ETRs are at the heart of this recent public debate, there is still 
an ongoing discussion in the tax avoidance literature about the appropriateness of the 
ETR as a tax avoidance measure (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010: 139). The ETR is easily 
available as firms have to disclose ETRs in their consolidated financial statements              
(ASC 740; IAS 12). But is the ETR really a reliable measure to depict a company’s 
overall performance in terms of the reduction of tax burden? Or is the reliability of the 
ETR biased by the consolidation processes, consideration of deferred taxes or other 
determinants?  
One challenge for the evaluation of this research question is that there are still no 
universally accepted definitions of, or constructs for, tax avoidance and its magnitude. In 
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 Cf.www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-
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previous studies, the definition of tax avoidance often comprises the reduction of explicit 
taxes. However, this definition does not distinguish between real activities that are tax-
favored and avoidance activities that are specifically undertaken to reduce taxes (Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010: 137). The development of a scope of tax avoidance behavior is also 
requested by the recent OECD discussion about base erosion and profit-shifting  
(OECD, 2013). 
A second challenge for the tax avoidance literature is the research on tax 
avoidance determinants (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001) and especially on the so-called 
undersheltering puzzle which covers the question why some corporations avoid more 
taxes than others (Weisbach, 2002). An increasing number of research studies have 
already investigated the influence of firm-specific characteristics including firm size, 
capital structure, asset mix and profitability (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003; Richardson and Lanis, 2007). A few studies 
also provide insight into the impact of foreign activities and international tax planning. 
Rego (2003), Collins and Shackelford (1995, 2003) as well as Markle and Shackelford 
(2012a) compare the ETRs of MNEs to those of domestic firms. In addition, Dyreng and 
Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012b) consider tax haven operations and 
proxies for profit-shifting channels as determinants of tax avoidance. 
However, about some determinants of the ETR as tax avoidance measure still very 
little is understood. One field where more research work is required is the effect of 
ownership structures on tax avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010: 146). While there 
are some studies investigating concentrated ownership structure such as family firms 
(Chen et al., 2010), there is still less known about the influence of the government as a 
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shareholder. Especially in the light of the financial crisis this topic became of certain 
interest as a number of multinational banks received capital injections which 
strengthened the respective government’s shareholder position. 
Another field where more empirical research is necessitated is the influence of 
public disclosure on tax avoidance. Recently, there is a focus on this topic as the current 
BEPS action plan requests more transparency concerning disclosure and tax planning 
activities (OECD, 2013). Additionally, the discussion was intensified by the recent case 
of Amazon that showed the impact public pressure caused by more accounting 
transparency has on tax avoidance.
2
 
In three essays, this thesis aims to contribute to these research gaps of the empirical 
tax avoidance literature. A new, more refined methodology based on the ETR for 
measuring tax avoidance is provided which aims to identify firms that pursue more tax 
aggressive strategies. In addition, well-known as well as so far less investigated 
determinants of tax avoidance such as government ownership and public disclosure are 
examined.  
The first essay “Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance”, 
co-authored with Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the University of 
Cologne, proposes a new measure that isolates the additional or even aggressive part in 
international tax avoidance and analyzes the determinants of aggressive tax avoidance of 
MNEs. A previous version of the paper was presented at the 1
st
 Doctoral Research 
Seminar in Vienna 2014, the 37
th 
European Accounting Association Annual Congress in 
Tallinn 2014, and the 4
th
 EIASM Workshop on Current Research in Taxation in 
Muenster 2014.  
                                                          
2
 Cf. http://fortune.com/2015/05/26/amazon-is-going-to-pay-more-tax-in-europe/. 
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In the second essay “Capital Injections and Aggressive Tax Planning - Can Banks 
Have It All?”, we investigate governments’ influence on tax aggressiveness of 
multinational banks. We measure this impact by analyzing the change in banks’ ETRs 
caused by capital injections during the financial crisis. The essay is based on a working 
paper with Julia Merz, former doctoral research assistant at the Chair of Business 
Taxation at the University of Cologne, and was presented at the Doctoral Research 
Seminar in Berlin 2015. 
The thesis concludes with the essay “Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and 
Aggressive International Tax Avoidance”, co-authored with Michael Overesch, Chair of 
Business Taxation at the University of Cologne and Pia Olligs, doctoral research 
assistant at the Chair of Business Taxation at the University of Cologne. This essay 
analyzes the influence of public disclosure of group structures in Exhibit 21 on tax 
avoidance of U.S. MNEs. The paper was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in 
Berlin 2015, the 2
nd
 Doctoral Research Seminar in Vienna 2015, the 38
th 
European 
Accounting Association Annual Congress 2015 in Glasgow, the Tagung der Kommission 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Steuerlehre der VHB 2015 and the Accounting Section of the 
German Economic Association 2015 (VfS). 
1.2. Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance 
1.2.1. Research Question and Design 
The essay “Measuring the Aggressive Part of International Tax Avoidance” 
provides a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax avoidance of MNEs. 
Our new measure ETRDIFF is computed as the difference between the average of the 
statutory tax rates imposed by all countries worldwide that host a subsidiary and the 
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ETR. A firm is classified as more tax aggressive if the gap between its ETR and its 
expected benchmark tax level according to the average statutory tax rate increases. 
Hence, our approach enables us to isolate more aggressive international tax planning 
from the simple influence of differences in host country tax levels. 
We compute the ETRDIFF measure for the S&P 500 firms over a period from 
2002 to 2012 by combining information of the location of subsidiaries disclosed in 
Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k and Compustat data. In addition, we consider a comparable 
data sample for German listed MNEs which have to disclose their subsidiaries according 
to § 313 (2) HGB and IFRS 12. For the manual collection of the statutory tax rates we 
use the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG and E&Y.  
Our main analysis refers to the GAAP ETRDIFF and Foreign ETRDIFF. We 
identify the scope of international tax avoidance in explorative analyses by evaluating 
sample means of our ETRDIFF measures in the total sample and in various subsamples 
which are associated with tax aggressive behavior. In particular, we consider subsamples 
containing firms with intense tax haven operations, firms with intense R&D activities 
and income mobile firms. In additional regression analyses, we use the ETRDIFF 
measures to identify the impact of firm characteristics and international tax planning 
strategies such as tax haven operations and profit-shifting opportunities on the scope of 
tax avoidance. 
We also conduct several robustness checks with respect to further ETRDIFF 
measures (Current ETRDIFF, Cash ETRDIFF and Foreign Current ETRDIFF) and 
well-established ETR measures (GAAP ETR and Foreign ETR). In addition, we consider 
an alternative definition of our benchmark tax level and weight the host countries’ 
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statutory tax rates by domestic sales as well as sales of a typical foreign subsidiary 
(adjusted ETRDIFF). 
1.2.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
Our explorative results confirm significant positive values for the ETRDIFF 
measures in particular for the U.S. firms suggesting additional tax avoidance beyond the 
benchmark tax level of the firms. We find even more positive values if we take the 
subsamples into consideration which reflect tax avoidance behavior. 
The findings of the regression analyses confirm that aggressive international tax 
avoidance is determined by tax haven operations and opportunities to manipulate 
transfer prices. We conclude that the ETRDIFF measures are not only more sufficient to 
measure the amount of aggressive tax avoidance but also helpful to analyze the influence 
of certain tax planning strategies.  
If we compare the results for U.S. and German firms, we receive similar effects for 
the influence of certain tax planning characteristics. Our results suggest that MNEs from 
the U.S. and from Germany can benefit from certain tax planning opportunities to the 
same extent. However, our explorative analysis of the total scope of tax avoidance 
suggests that U.S. MNEs are particularly aggressive. Our findings from the explorative 
and regression analyses are robust if we consider the adjusted ETRDIFF. 
The study contributes to the previous literature investigating determinants of tax 
avoidance (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Especially, it refers to a small strand of studies 
which isolate an unexplained residual that might be attributed to international tax 
avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009; 
Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay, 2012). Thus, we also contribute to the current OECD 
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BEPS discussion (OECD, 2013) which requests new measures to analyze the scope and 
determinants of base erosion and profit-shifting. 
1.3. Capital Injections and Aggressive Tax Planning -    
 Can Banks Have It All? 
1.3.1. Research Question and Design 
The essay “Capital Injections and Aggressive Tax Planning - Can Banks Have It 
All?” analyzes government influence on tax planning activities of multinational banks. 
For this analysis we use the fact that during the recent financial crisis a number of 
financial institutions received capital injections by their respective government. Based 
on empirical evidence of previous studies investigating the influence of state ownership 
on tax avoidance (Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007), we 
assume that banks will change their tax aggressiveness after they receive public funds.                                                                                                          
The optimal setting to investigate this research question would require observing 
the tax aggressiveness measured by a bank’s ETR with and without recapitalization. As 
this is not observable and the treatment status is not random, we create a counterfactual 
control group as similar as possible to the recapitalized banks (treated group) by 
employing propensity score matching. 
We use a five to one nearest neighbor propensity score matching in a difference-
in-differences framework (DID-PSM approach) and measure the effect of the 
recapitalization treatment by comparing the change in tax aggressiveness of the 
treatment group before (2007) and after (2011) receiving government support to the 
counterfactual trend of the control group in absence of recapitalization. By combining 
the strength of these two approaches towards causal inference our analysis is robust to 
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the selection of observables and time-invariant unobserved effects (Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd, 1998). 
To avoid possible bias due to our chosen event window or our matching method, 
we also conduct several robustness checks. Therefore, we consider different matching 
algorithms (one to one nearest neighbor and kernel matching) and set 2010 instead of 
2011 as our relevant after-crisis year. Moreover, we examine effects for subsamples with 
respect to different regions (European and U.S. based banks). 
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique hand-collected data set of 93 banks 
located in 10 OECD countries which received capital injections in 2008 and/or 2009. 
Our control group of non-recapitalized banks consists of 763 banks in the respective 
countries. The consolidated financial statement information is collected from the 
Bankscope Database provided by Bureau van Dijk.  
1.3.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results of our analysis indicate that a government influence in form of capital 
injections had a limiting effect on banks’ tax aggressiveness. Our difference-in-
differences approach provides evidence that banks receiving public funds had 
significantly lower ETRs and were thus more tax aggressive one year before the 
financial crisis in 2007. After the recapitalization in 2008 and/or 2009, however, the 
ETRs for the treated and the control group converged and we cannot confirm 
significantly different ETRs. Our results are supported by our robustness checks, 
applying another event window and different matching methods. A split of our sample 
suggests that the limiting effect differs among regions and is especially pronounced in 
Europe.  
  
11 
 
We attribute this finding to governments’ strengthened shareholder position due to 
capital injections during the financial crisis. Interestingly, our analysis shows that banks 
changed their tax aggressiveness although there were no contractual conditions tied to 
receiving such funds which targeted tax payments.  
The paper contributes to the previous studies analyzing the influence of ownership 
structure and corporate governance on the tax avoidance of multinational firms (Chen et 
al., 2010; Chyz et al., 2013; Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 
2007). In the context of financial institutions, however, there is still less understood 
about the effect of ownership structure and especially about the impact of state 
ownership on tax planning activities. Although banks’ tax aggressiveness in general has 
already been investigated (Keen and de Mooij, 2012; Heckemeyer and de Mooij, 2013; 
Huizinga, Voget and Wagner, 2014), we are the first to investigate the relationship 
between governments’ position as a shareholder due to recapitalizations and banks’ tax 
avoidance.  
Thus, this paper also contributes to an increasing number of studies about banks 
which received government support during the financial crisis and their characteristics 
(Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter, 2013; Mariathasan and Merrouche 2012; Panetta et al., 
2009).  
1.4. Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and Aggressive              
     International Tax Avoidance 
1.4.1. Research Question and Design 
The essay “Public Disclosure of Foreign Subsidiaries and Aggressive 
International Tax Avoidance” explores the impact of public disclosure of subsidiaries in 
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Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k on the tax aggressiveness of U.S. MNEs. Our research question 
is based on the phenomenon that since 2008 several U.S. multinational firms have 
removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21, although they still 
exist.
3
 We consider Exhibit 21 as a simplified country-by-country reporting. The prior 
tax literature finds that less accounting transparency concerning different types of 
country-by-country reporting leads to more aggressive tax behavior (e.g., Hope, Ma and 
Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2014).  
Therefore, we expect firms which have decided to publicly disclose fewer foreign 
subsidiaries in their Exhibit 21 to become more tax aggressive compared to firms that do 
not change their public disclosure attitude. Moreover, we investigate the influence of 
other well-known determinants of international tax avoidance such as tax haven 
operations and profit-shifting opportunities. As tax avoidance measure we consider the 
Foreign ETR in our main analysis. 
For our empirical study we use a pooled data set of listed U.S. MNEs for 2007 and 
2012 as these years can be considered the beginning and the end period of significant 
changes in reporting of foreign subsidiaries. During this period we identify more than 30 
diminishing firms which significantly reduced the number of foreign subsidiaries 
disclosed in Exhibit 21.  
We contacted each of these diminishing firms in order to evaluate their reasons to 
change their disclosure behavior. As those firms which responded to our request refer to 
M&A activities as particular reason, we control for changes in Exhibit 21 due to M&A 
in our study. Furthermore, to show the robustness of our results, we also conduct several 
                                                          
3
 Cf. The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary – From Google to FedEx, Wall Street Journal, 5/22/2013; 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323463704578497290099032374. 
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alternative analyses concerning different specifications of diminishing and different 
measures of international aggressive tax avoidance (Foreign Current ETR, GAAP ETR 
and ETRDIFF measures). 
The information of Exhibit 21 is taken from the SEC’s database EDGAR. The 
consolidated financial statement information is extracted from Compustat North 
America. Tax data is hand-collected from the worldwide corporate tax summaries of 
PwC, KPMG and E&Y. 
1.4.2. Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The findings of our difference-in-differences estimations suggest a significant rise 
in tax avoidance as a response to less public disclosure of foreign subsidiaries. In 
addition, our analysis confirms that international tax planning behavior by U.S. based 
firms is associated with tax haven operations and profit-shifting opportunities. The effect 
of public disclosure on tax avoidance is robust across our robustness checks.                                                                                                              
One restriction to our results is a potential endogeneity problem, as some firms 
might diminish the number of subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21, because they are 
already tax aggressive. However, as none of the diminishing firms we contacted refer to 
tax planning as reason of main interest, we do not expect endogeneity to be problematic. 
To corroborate this idea, we use the regression-based form of the Hausman test for 
endogeneity (Hausman 1978, 1983) which also confirms that the potential endogeneity 
is not of further interest.   
The study contributes to a small strand of research which analyzes the relationship 
between public disclosure and the scope of international tax avoidance (Hope, Ma and 
Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 2014). It provides new insights into the 
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discussion whether firms are less tax aggressive if they perceive costs associated with 
public pressure (Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock, 2014; Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian and 
Sandner, 2014). Thus, our results suggesting that publicly disclosed country-by-country 
information could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior also contribute to the recent 
BEPS discussion in which more accounting transparency is requested.  
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Abstract:  
We propose a new measure that isolates the additional or even aggressive part in 
international tax avoidance from well-known determinants of effective tax rates (ETRs). 
Our new measure ETRDIFF is computed as the difference between the average of the 
statutory tax rates imposed by all countries worldwide that host a subsidiary of the 
respective MNE and the ETR. We classify a firm as more tax aggressive if the 
difference between its ETR and its benchmark tax rate according to the average statutory 
tax rate of its host countries increases. We apply our new measure to multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from the U.S. and from Germany. Our results suggest that in 
particular U.S. MNEs are tax aggressive in terms of international tax avoidance. 
Additional analysis reveals that the aggressive part of international tax avoidance is 
associated with tax haven operations and profit-shifting opportunities.  
 
Key words: Effective Tax Rate, Tax Accounting, Tax Aggressiveness, International Tax 
Planning 
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2.1. Introduction 
It is well-known that multinational enterprises (MNEs) can avoid taxes. 
However, there is no broad agreement about the definition of “aggressive” tax 
avoidance. We propose a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax 
avoidance of multinational enterprises and analyze the determinants of aggressive tax 
avoidance. The new measure is used to analyze the tax aggressiveness of MNEs from 
the U.S. and from Germany.  
The public debate on the aggressive tax avoidance of some MNEs has been 
stimulated by very low effective tax rates (ETRs).
4
 For example, Google Inc. paid only  
$0.36 billion foreign taxes on $8.1 billion of non-U.S. profits in 2012 which leads to a 
foreign ETR lower than 5 %.
5
 As statutory tax rates on corporate income are 
significantly higher in most industrialized countries, this creates an expectation gap 
between the disclosed tax position and common expectations about the tax level 
imposed.  
We propose a new measure of international tax avoidance determining the 
expectation gap explained above. Our new measure ETRDIFF is computed as the 
difference between a firm’s individual benchmark tax level and an ETR. As benchmark 
tax level we consider the average of the statutory tax rates imposed by all countries 
worldwide that host a subsidiary of the respective MNE. The ETRDIFF measure 
considers that tax levels of MNEs vary in accordance with the variation in statutory tax 
rates of their host countries and isolates only the additional or even aggressive part of 
                                                          
4
 Cf. public hearings on tax avoidance in the U.S. or United Kingdom, e.g. U.S. Senate, Permanent 
Subcommittee on investigations, Hearing On Offshore Profit-Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code, 9/20/2012; 
House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts, 11/12/2012. 
5
 Cf. Google U.K. paid £ 11.2m in corporate tax, The Financial Times, 30/09/2013. 
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international tax avoidance. Accordingly, we classify a firm as more tax aggressive if the 
gap between its ETR and its expected benchmark tax rate according to the average 
statutory tax rate increases.         
The previous literature has already investigated the determinants of tax avoidance 
in financial accounting data (for an overview cf. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Most of 
the literature refers to different types of ETRs (Collins and Shackelford, 1995, 2003; 
Rego, 2003; Plesko, 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). A few studies isolate 
some unexplained residual that might be attributed to international tax avoidance and 
analyze abnormal or permanent differences between book and tax income (Desai and 
Dharmapala, 2006, 2009; Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009). Balakrishnan, Blouin and 
Guay (2012) consider a firm’s deviation from the industry mean of several tax measures 
as an indicator of tax aggressiveness. However, these studies do not take into account 
the simple fact of significantly varying host country tax rates. Accordingly, previous 
evidence has not disentangled the elementary effect of tax rate variation across host 
countries from additional or even aggressive tax avoidance like transfer pricing, 
royalties or ‘check-the-box’ techniques. 
We compute our new ETRDIFF measure for the S&P 500 firms over a period 
from 2002 to 2012. For the computation, we use the fact that U.S. listed firms are 
obliged to publish a list of their significant subsidiaries’ location in Exhibit 21 of Form 
10-k and combine this information with Compustat data. Different versions of our 
ETRDIFF measure referring to the GAAP ETR and the Foreign ETR are considered.  
Our explorative analyses depict positive ETRDIFF measures for U.S. MNEs 
suggesting additional tax avoidance beyond the benchmark tax level of the firms. We 
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find a mean Foreign ETRDIFF of 5 percentage points. That means the difference 
between the Foreign ETR and the average of the statutory corporate tax rates of all host 
countries of a firm is 5 percentage points. As robustness test, we also consider 
alternative definitions of our benchmark tax level and weight host country taxes by sales 
of subsidiaries. We find that the adjusted definition is associated with slightly larger 
ETRDIFF measures, but differences between adjusted and unadjusted ETRDIFF 
measures are small.   
In additional regression analyses, we use our ETRDIFF measure to identify the 
impact of firm characteristics and certain international tax planning strategies on the 
scope of aggressive international tax avoidance. The findings confirm the influence of 
some well-known determinants of tax avoidance like size or profitability but also of 
proxies for certain tax planning opportunities. In particular, the amount of additional tax 
avoidance is determined by tax haven operations and the opportunities to manipulate 
transfer prices. 
In addition to our analysis of tax aggressiveness of U.S. firms, we also investigate 
the amount of aggressive tax avoidance of MNEs from Germany as Europe’s biggest 
economy. A comparison of U.S. firms and German firms is interesting for several 
reasons. Since taxes are high both in the U.S. and Germany, MNEs from both countries 
have the same strong incentives to use international tax planning strategies. However, 
U.S. taxation of foreign income differs from the international tax system in most 
countries. While foreign income of U.S. MNEs is also subject to U.S. corporate income 
taxes, most other countries in the world apply an exemption system to foreign business 
income that is very similar to the German tax system. Moreover, anecdotal evidence 
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suggests that some U.S. firms use aggressive tax planning strategies because U.S. 
controlled foreign company (CFC) rules are not very effective under certain conditions 
(Altshuler and Grubert, 2006). However, these rules (‘check the box’) are specific to the 
U.S. tax code and MNEs from other countries cannot benefit from these tax planning 
opportunities.
6
  
 A comparison between U.S. and German firms reveals that U.S. MNEs are 
particularly tax aggressive. Further regression analysis of the potential determinants of 
aggressive tax avoidance, however, suggests that MNEs from the U.S. and from 
Germany benefit from certain tax planning opportunities to the same extent.   
Our measure allows identification of the aggressive part in tax avoidance. We 
therefore contribute to the current discussion about base erosion and profit-shifting 
(BEPS) of MNEs (OECD, 2013). This is of particular interest, as the OECD requests 
new measures to analyze the scope and the determinants of base erosion and profit-
shifting.
 7
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe our 
new ETRDIFF measure. In Section 2.3, we use the measure to compute the amount of 
tax aggressiveness for MNEs from the U.S. and Germany. Section 2.4 provides a 
regression analysis of the determinants of aggressive international tax avoidance. 
Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
. 
                                                          
6
 A study by Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) suggests that the German CFC rules effectively prevent 
German MNEs from using tax planning strategies in terms of financial structures at tax haven locations. 
7
 Cf. http://www.oecd.org/ctp/oecd-releases-public-request-for-input-on-beps-action-11.htm. 
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2.2. Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
2.2.1. A New Measure for Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
To analyze aggressive international tax avoidance, convincing measures are 
needed. ETRs are commonly used proxies for tax avoidance and well-accepted measures 
for tax behavior in previous literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). A lower ETR 
suggests that a firm is more effectively avoiding income taxes than other firms with 
higher ETRs. A few studies have investigated the impact of foreign activities on this 
already well-established tax avoidance measure. Rego (2003), Collins and Shackelford 
(1995, 2003) as well as Markle and Shackelford (2012a) compare ETRs of MNEs with 
those of domestic firms. Expectations for the impact of international activities on the 
ETR are ambiguous. On the one hand, investments in high tax countries like the U.S., 
Canada, Germany or Japan are associated with increasing ETRs. On the other hand, 
MNEs invest in low-tax countries or even tax havens.  
As international differences in corporate tax rates are significant and subsidiaries 
are subject to taxation in their host countries, we argue that a reduction in the ETR just 
because of establishing an additional foreign subsidiary in a host country with a 
moderate tax level should not be denoted as “aggressive” tax avoidance. We therefore 
propose a new type of measures that isolate more aggressive international tax planning 
from the simple influence of differences in host country tax levels. We characterize 
strategies like, for example, income shifting to low-tax countries or tax havens as 
aggressive tax avoidance (cf. Section 2.2.2 for an overview).  
More precisely, our measure follows the idea that additional or even aggressive tax 
planning is associated with significantly lower ETRs compared with an expected 
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benchmark tax level. Therefore, our new measure ETRDIFF is computed as the 
difference between a firm’s individual benchmark tax level and an ETR. We compute 
the following measures for each multinational firm i in fiscal year t:    
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑇𝑅 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
where: 
𝑆𝑇𝑅:  Worldwide average of the statutory corporate tax 
rates of all host countries of the firm i where a 
subsidiary is located (no consideration of tax 
haven countries).  
ETR Measure: Effective tax rate measure like the GAAP ETR, 
Current ETR, Cash ETR, Foreign ETR or Foreign 
Current ETR. 
 
Our ETRDIFF measures identify abnormally small ETRs that cannot be explained 
by a benchmark tax level. Accordingly, an MNE is tax aggressive if its ETRDIFF is 
positive. This means its ETR is abnormally low compared to a benchmark tax level that 
would be expected in the absence of any profit-shifting strategies and shell corporations 
in tax haven countries. We use different versions of our ETRDIFF, considering the 
GAAP ETR, Current ETR, Cash ETR, Foreign ETR or Foreign Current ETR. 
Our benchmark STR is the average of the statutory corporate income tax rates of 
all countries worldwide that host a subsidiary of the respective firm. Since STR is used 
as a proxy for the expected tax level according to the distribution of real economic 
activities, we do not consider tax haven countries for the computation. Thus, our 
benchmark tax level is determined by a firm’s individual business model, i.e., by 
location choices, but is not affected by particular aggressive tax planning strategies.   
We argue that the statutory corporate tax rate of a host country is a convincing 
benchmark for the proper tax level of an MNE’s subsidiary in the absence of any 
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additional tax planning activities. Foreign income of U.S. MNEs is also subject to U.S. 
corporate income taxes at repatriation. Since U.S. taxes can be deferred if foreign 
income is retained, many U.S. firms avoid redistribution and prefer to reinvest or hold 
just cash in their foreign subsidiaries (Foley et al., 2007). Moreover, ASC 740-30-25-3 
provides an exception to deferred tax accounting for permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings.
8
  In contrast to the U.S. tax system, most other countries in the world apply an 
exemption system to foreign business income.  
A higher ETRDIFF measure indicates more aggressive tax avoidance. An 
additional subsidiary in a host country imposing only a low corporate tax rate affects the 
ETR as well as the STR. If an MNE benefits from additional tax savings due to profit-
shifting or other aggressive international tax planning, the ETR decreases while the STR 
remains constant. The more extensively an MNE uses tax planning strategies to 
decouple the locations of its business activities from those of taxable income, the more 
STR and ETR differ.  
While we are the first to propose a measure of tax avoidance that isolates the effect 
of more aggressive international tax planning strategies from the influence of differences 
in tax rates, the idea of using a differential between ETR and statutory tax rate as tax 
avoidance measure is well-known in the tax literature (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
Considering the influence of international taxation, we replace the statutory tax rate of 
the home country by the average of all statutory tax rates imposed by all host countries 
of an MNE. Our ETRDIFF also relates to a measure proposed by Balakrishnan, Blouin 
                                                          
8
 ASC 740-30-25-3 (formerly APB 23) allows a U.S. multinational to assert that its investment (outside 
basis) in a foreign subsidiary is permanent and those foreign earnings will be indefinitely reinvested, so 
there is no current or deferred incremental U.S. tax liability. 
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and Guay (2012) that benchmarks a firm’s tax level with the industry mean of this 
respective tax measure. Using the industry mean as a benchmark, however, might lead to 
some underestimation of the scope of international tax avoidance if almost all firms in a 
certain industry avoid taxes through international structures.  
Compared to previous studies, our approach allows to isolate the aggressive part of 
international tax avoidance as it considers that tax levels of MNEs vary in accordance 
with the variation in statutory tax rates of their host countries. The ETRDIFF reflects the 
scope of additional tax planning that cannot be explained by the distribution of a firm’s 
real activities, i.e., the subsidiary locations. Put differently, our measure might also be 
interpreted as a performance indicator for the international tax planning strategies of an 
MNE. 
2.2.2. Determinants of Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
Some of the variation in the ETRs of MNEs can be explained by the international 
variation of corporate tax rates. The remaining variation should be mainly attributed to 
additional tax planning strategies. A broad literature has analyzed subsidiary level data 
and provides evidence for income shifting. Profits are shifted and disclosed by 
subsidiaries subject to low tax rates. Previous studies have found that reported profits of 
multinational subsidiaries are inversely related to the local tax level suggesting intra-
firm shifting of taxable profits (cf. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; 
Blouin, Robinson and Seidman, 2015; Klassen and LaPlante, 2012a, 2012b). Moreover, 
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MNEs establish subsidiaries in tax haven countries (Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006)
9
 and 
benefit from different definitions of residence (Ting, 2014).  
While several studies find evidence for tax planning in subsidiary level data, in 
Section 2.4 we analyze how certain strategies of international tax avoidance affect tax 
measures computed for the consolidated financial statements of MNEs. Our analysis is 
related to studies by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012a, 
2012b) that consider tax haven operations and proxies for profit-shifting channels as 
determinants of ETR measures. These studies, however, analyzed ETR measures, 
whereas our measurement of tax avoidance is already adjusted for the influence arising 
from very different tax levels across foreign subsidiaries.  
In addition, we also provide empirical evidence from German MNEs. To the best 
of our knowledge, there are only two empirical studies which investigate influence 
factors on the ETRs of German MNEs. However, these studies do not provide an in-
depth analysis of international tax planning. Sureth, Halberstadt and Bischoff (2009) 
conclude from their analysis that foreign operations have no effect on ETRs of German 
firms, whereas Kraft (2014) finds a negative impact of foreign operations on ETRs.  
2.3. Measuring Aggressive Tax Avoidance of U.S. and German MNEs 
In this section, we compute our new ETRDIFF measure for the S&P 500 firms. 
Moreover, we apply our measure to a comparable sample of listed firms from Germany 
as the biggest economy in Europe. Although the public debate about aggressive base 
erosion and tax planning is particularly focused on U.S. MNEs, it has attracted 
                                                          
9
 Subpart F of the IRC should prevent U.S. based firms from using subsidiaries in tax havens. However, 
U.S. firms can opt to disregard entities in their U.S. tax returns (‘check the box’) to avoid the 
consequences of Subpart F. 
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increasing global attention in recent years (Dharmapala, 2014). Therefore, we also 
investigate the tax aggressiveness of European MNEs.  
2.3.1. Sample Selection 
First, we consider a panel of U.S. firms listed in the S&P 500 over the period from 
2002 to 2012. We take financial data from Compustat North America (5,907 firm-year 
observations). The construction of our ETRDIFF measure requires information about 
subsidiary locations. Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k contains information about significant 
subsidiaries (Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K).
10
 Similar to Dyreng and Lindsey (2009), 
we use the subsidiary information disclosed in Exhibit 21 and available at the SEC’s 
database EDGAR.
11
 On average, a U.S. firm in our sample has 132 subsidiaries. 
Companies which do not provide an Exhibit 21 in EDGAR are not included in our data 
sample. We refer to the group structure disclosed in the Exhibit 21 from 2007, because 
U.S. companies removed hundreds of offshore subsidiaries from their publicly disclosed 
financial filings in the upcoming years (Herbert, Olligs and Overesch, 2015).
12
  
Moreover, we limit our sample to multinational U.S. based firms and thus delete all 
firms which are not headquartered in the U.S. and have only domestic subsidiaries. 
Imposing these prerequisites on the data set creates a sample of 4,345 firm-year 
observations.  
                                                          
10
 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), a subsidiary can be deemed not to be a significant 
subsidiary if all of the following three conditions are met: (1) the parent company’s and its other 
subsidiaries’ investments in the subsidiary do not exceed 10 % of the parent company’s total assets; (2) 
the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the assets of the subsidiary do not 
exceed 10 % of the consolidated firm’s total assets; and (3) the parent company’s and its other 
subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income from continuing operations does not 
exceed 10 % of the consolidated income from continuing operations. 
11
 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
12
 Cf. The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary – From Google to FedEx, Wall Street Journal, 5/22/2013. 
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Furthermore, we limit the sample to companies having a positive pre-tax income 
(pi) as it is difficult to analyze our results concerning the tax planning activities of loss 
firms (cf. Stickney and McGee, 1982; Zimmermann, 1983; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Rego, 2003).
13
 We exclude observations with ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1 to limit the 
influence of outliers. In addition, we delete observations due to missing values in 
financial information used as control variables in supplement analysis in Section 2.4.  
We derive 2,422 firm-year observations for the GAAP ETRDIFF (Panel A) and 
1,760 firm-year-observations for the Foreign ETRDIFF (Panel B). Summary statistics of 
all variables used can be found in the Appendix 2. 
In an additional analysis, we also compute the GAAP ETRDIFF for a sample of 
German listed firms that is comparable to the sample of U.S. firms. We consider all 
firms listed on the indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX in 2010. Real estate 
investment trusts, banks and insurance companies are excluded from our sample. 
Furthermore, we eliminate MNEs without German headquarters and firms having no 
foreign subsidiaries. Financial statement information is taken from the database 
Compustat Global. Our analysis considers data for the fiscal years 2007 – 2012.14  
Comparable to Exhibit 21 of form 10-k, for German listed firms § 313 (2) HGB 
and IFRS 12 oblige a detailed public disclosure of the worldwide subsidiaries in form of 
a complete listing. We consider all subsidiaries that are directly or indirectly owned by 
the German parent firm to a degree of at least 50 % in 2010. We collect information 
about the corresponding host country and statutory corporate income tax rates of 
                                                          
13
 In case of the foreign ETRDIFF measures, we require a positive pre-tax foreign income. 
14
 We consider only data from 2007 – 2012 to avoid any influence from different accounting standards. 
Prior to 2007, German listed firms prepared their financial report in accordance with local German GAAP, 
IAS or even U.S. GAAP. 
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subsidiaries in 177 countries in 2010. A German listed firm in our sample has on 
average 152 subsidiaries.  
Again, MNEs with a negative group profit before tax or ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1 
and missing data in Compustat Global were excluded. Our final sample consists of 562 
firm-year observations (Panel C). Summary statistics can be found in Appendix 2. 
2.3.2. Aggressive Tax Avoidance of U.S. and German MNEs 
We apply the methodology described in Section 2.2.1 to compute our ETRDIFF 
measures for each firm included in our samples. Table 1 depicts mean values for the 
GAAP ETRDIFF of MNEs from the U.S. and Germany as well as the Foreign ETRDIFF 
of U.S. MNEs. Unfortunately, Compustat Global does not provide information to 
compute the Foreign ETR. Thus, we cannot compute the corresponding                        
Foreign ETRDIFF for German firms.   
Considering U.S. firms, the mean GAAP ETRDIFF is 0.018 (Panel A). The value 
of 0.018 means that the difference between the GAAP ETR (sample mean: 30.3 %) and 
the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates of all host countries of a firm                       
(sample mean: 32.1 %) is 1.8 percentage points. The mean value for the Foreign 
ETRDIFF is larger and amounts to 0.05. The positive ETRDIFF shows additional tax 
avoidance beyond the benchmark tax level associated with the international tax rate 
distribution across host countries. 
As benchmark tax level we consider the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates 
of all host countries of a firm (STR). Tax haven countries are neglected because setting 
up a tax haven subsidiary might be already interpreted as an aggressive form of tax 
avoidance. The mean value for the STR is approximately 0.32 which is nevertheless 
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smaller than the U.S. tax level due to smaller corporate tax rates imposed by several host 
countries.  
Interestingly, the mean GAAP ETRDIFF for our sample of German listed firms 
(Panel C) is negative with -0.03. On average, firms in our sample report a GAAP ETR 
that is larger than its benchmark tax level determined by the statutory corporate tax rates 
of its host countries. A potential reason for the German firms’ GAAP ETRs being higher 
compared to those of the U.S. firms could be the smaller percentage of income mobile 
firms in Germany (14 % vs. 22 %) which are associated with more tax avoidance          
(cf. Tables 1 and 2).
15
 The mean value for the benchmark STR is 0.28 which is 
significantly smaller compared to U.S. firms. German firms are more often active in host 
countries offering smaller nominal tax rates.  
A comparison between the ETRDIFF measures for the German and the U.S. 
sample in Table 1 suggests that U.S. firms are particularly more successful in terms of 
additional or even aggressive international tax avoidance. 
TABLE 1: Summary Statistics Subsamples – ETRDIFF 
  U.S. Firms German Firms 
 
GAAP ETRDIFF Foreign ETRDIFF GAAP ETRDIFF 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean 
(1) TOTAL 2,422 0.0179 1,760 0.0502 562 -0.0304 
(2) HAVEN 513 0.0328 274 0.0947 136 0.0076 
(3) R&D 705 0.0577 648 0.1042 135 -0.0024 
(4) INCOME MOBILE = 1 528 0.0556 481 0.1189 77 -0.0095 
Notes: Table 1 shows descriptive results for the dependent variables GAAP ETRDIFF and Foreign  ETRDIFF for U.S. 
and German firms for different (sub)samples: (1) Total number of observations; (2) HAVEN in top-75% percentile; (3) 
R&D intensity in top-75% percentile; (4) INCOME MOBILE = 1. 
                                                          
15
 The high GAAP ETRs of German MNEs in our sample are also attributed to high deferred taxes. The 
mean Current ETR is approximately 17.54 %.  
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Moreover, Table 1 reports sample means of ETRDIFF measures for different 
subsamples that might be more tax aggressive: (i) firms with tax haven operations in the 
top-75% percentile, (ii) firms with an R&D intensity in the top-75% percentile, and       
(iii) income mobile firms. The additional data clearly illustrates that compared to the 
total sample, ETRDIFF measures increase if we only consider firms with intense tax 
haven operations, income mobile firms, or firms with intense R&D activities. The mean          
GAAP ETRDIFF of U.S. MNEs doubles for firms with intense tax haven usage or when 
firms from income mobile industries are considered. The differences become even more 
apparent for the Foreign ETRDIFF. The mean value computed for firms in income 
mobile industries is 0.12. The Foreign ETRDIFF of 0.12 translates into a Foreign ETR 
that is about 60 % of the benchmark tax level derived from host country tax rates.  
A similar pattern can be observed for German firms. Compared to the total sample, 
the ETRDIFF significantly increase if we only consider firms with intense tax haven 
operations or firms with intense R&D activities.  
This explorative analysis is, however, only a first indication for the influence of 
certain tax planning strategies on taxes effectively avoided. In Section 2.4, we will use 
regression analysis to identify the impact of firm characteristics and certain international 
tax planning strategies on the scope of aggressive international tax avoidance. 
2.3.3. Adjusted Benchmark Tax Level 
As benchmark tax level for our ETRDIFF measures we consider the mean of the 
statutory corporate tax rates of all host countries of a firm (STR). The most important 
concern with the use of a simple mean of the corporate tax rates across all locations of 
an MNE is the asymmetric economic relevance of locations. However, as a country-by-
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country reporting is neither required for the U.S. nor for the German firms, financial data 
of each subsidiary are not available. Unfortunately, no additional financial information is 
included in Exhibit 21.  
However, as a robustness check, we try to approximate the economic weights of 
subsidiaries. For the U.S. firms, we do so by using statistics on the outward activities of 
U.S. MNEs provided by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). These statistics provide information about sales of U.S. controlled 
foreign subsidiaries for each host country and the number of U.S. subsidiaries located in 
the respective country.
16 
We use this sales data and construct a new weighting scheme 
for the host countries of each individual firm. STR is now computed as a weighted 
average of the host counties’ statutory tax rates using  domestic sales as well as sales of  
typical foreign subsidiaries as weights.
17
  
For the German firms, we refer to adequate statistics about outward activities 
provided by the German Federal Reserve (Deutsche Bundesbank).
18
 As alternative 
weights for computing our benchmark tax level STR we consider the average amount of 
sales carried out by German controlled subsidiaries in a host country.
19
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Available for download on http://www.bea.gov/international/di1usdop.htm. 
17
 Average domestic sales of a typical U.S. subsidiary is assumed to be 55 % of total sales.                                                                       
http://us.spindices.com/documents/research/research-sp-500-2014-global-sales.pdf?force_download=true 
18
 Available for download on http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Veroeffentlichungen/Statis-
tische_Sonderveroeffentlichungen/Statso_10/statistische_sonderveroeffentlichungen_10.html. 
19
 Average domestic sales of a typical German subsidiary is assumed to be 25 % of total sales.                                              
http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/industrie/umsatzanteile-welche-dax-konzerne-vor-allem-im-ausland-
verdienen/9789206.html.                                                                  
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics Subsamples – ETRDIFF adjusted 
 
U.S. Firms German Firms 
 
GAAP ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
Foreign ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
GAAP ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
  N Mean N Mean N Mean 
(1) TOTAL 2,422 0.0331 1,760 0.0644 562 -0.0180 
(2) HAVEN 513 0.0492 274 0.1112 136   0.0179 
(3) R&D 705 0.0718 648 0.1174 135   0.0050 
(4) INCOME MOBILE = 1 528 0.0701 481 0.1322 77   0.0021 
Notes: Table 2 shows descriptive results for the dependent variables GAAP ETRDIFF adjusted and Foreign ETRDIFF 
adjusted for U.S. and German firms for different (sub)samples: (1) Total number of observations; (2) HAVEN in top-
75% percentile; (3) R&D intensity in top-75% percentile; (4) INCOME MOBILE = 1. 
 
Table 2 depicts adjusted ETRDIFF measures using this alternative weighting 
scheme for STR. For U.S. and German firms, mean values for the adjusted ETRDIFF 
measures are slightly larger compared to the values computed without any adjustment. 
We conclude that the MNEs in our samples tend to have larger economic activities 
(measured by sales) in high tax countries. Therefore, the arithmetic mean of statutory tax 
rates across all host countries underestimates the benchmark tax level. Accordingly, the 
values reported for our standard definition of the ETRDIFF might underestimate the 
aggressive part of international tax avoidance to some extent.  
Although the differences between adjusted and unadjusted ETRDIFF measures are 
small, this exercise suggests that more refined data about relevance of economic 
activities of subsidiaries for the individual firm would be helpful to better infer the 
amount of aggressive international tax avoidance. Therefore, a detailed country-by-
country reporting as discussed in the OECD action plan against base erosion and profit-
shifting would be welcome (OECD, 2013). 
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2.4. Determinants of Aggressive Tax Avoidance 
2.4.1.  Research Design 
We estimate the following OLS regression to analyze the determinants of 
aggressive (international) tax avoidance of firm i in year t: 
    𝐸𝑇𝑅𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 
              +  𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐻𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑂𝑀𝐸 𝑀𝑂𝐵𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡   
                         + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                     (1)  
We analyze different versions of our ETRDIFF, considering the GAAP ETR and 
Foreign ETR. We consider determinants of general tax avoidance that have been widely 
used in the previous literature. Moreover, we add variables reflecting certain 
international tax planning opportunities of the firm. A description of all variables and 
descriptive statistics are shown in the Appendix. 
As a general determinant of tax avoidance we consider SIZE measured by total 
assets (in logs). Some studies reveal a positive correlation between size and ETR 
(Zimmermann, 1983; Wang, 1991; Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003), whereas other studies 
find a negative influence (Chen et al., 2010). Moreover, we take account of 
PROFITABILITY measured as pre-tax income divided by total assets. Most studies find 
a positive correlation of ETR and profitability (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 
2003; Chen et al., 2010). However, some papers also detect the opposite (Rego, 2003).  
The variable capital intensity (CAPINT) is the quotient between property, plant 
and equipment and total assets. The most widely obtained result is a negative correlation 
with ETR (Gupta and Newberry, 1997) which leads to the assumption that a high level 
of property, plant and equipment causes a reduction in ETR due to the deductibility of 
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high depreciation. However, not all studies have reached the same conclusion (Plesko, 
2003). In the context of international tax planning, higher capital intensity might also 
indicate less mobility of income. In this case, we expect a negative effect of capital 
intensity on the ETRDIFF.    
Additionally, we include the variable LEV in our analysis which is defined as 
short-term liabilities divided by total assets. Firms with a high level of debt can use the 
deductibility of interest expenses to reduce tax burden. However, the effect of leverage 
on tax avoidance is ambiguous since interest payments do not only reduce taxable 
profits, and thus, tax expenditures, but also pre-tax earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman, 
2010). Moreover, interest deductibility is additionally restricted due to thin-
capitalization rules (Buettner et al., 2012). While some previous research studies find an 
inverse relation (Stickney and McGee, 1982; Plesko, 2003; Markle and Shackelford, 
2012b), others found the opposite (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, we have no clear 
prediction concerning aggressive international tax avoidance. 
Furthermore, we consider variables for international tax planning via the use of tax 
havens and profit-shifting. We expect positive effects for all proxies for international tax 
planning activities on the ETRDIFF measures.  
First, we construct a variable HAVEN which is the number of tax haven countries 
in which the group has subsidiaries scaled by the total number of countries in which the 
company operates.
20
  In addition, we include a variable R&D which is defined as R&D 
expenses scaled by total assets in our analysis as firms with a large amount of R&D are 
                                                          
20
 The definition of tax haven countries follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). Note that tax haven 
subsidiaries are not considered when computing the benchmark tax level used for the ETRDIFF. 
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able to locate their provisions associated with R&D expenses in low-tax countries 
(Harris, 1993; Grubert, 2003).
21
  
Especially firms in high-tech and pharmaceutical industries (“income mobile 
industries”) have significant intellectual property and products which allow them to 
implement tax avoidance strategies by shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions via 
transfer-pricing. Therefore, according to De Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014), we 
classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 
(Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). We compute a dummy 
variable INCOME MOBILE which equals one if the industry membership of the parent 
is supposed to be income mobile. 
As tax avoidance opportunities differ across industries due to the different 
business models (Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay, 2012), we consider industry-fixed 
effects in accordance with the Fama and French classification of 17 different industry 
groups.
22
 
2.4.2. Tax Avoidance Determinants for U.S. Firms 
We start our empirical analysis with the sample of U.S. MNEs and consider the 
GAAP ETRDIFF and Foreign ETRDIFF as dependent variables. Table 3 depicts the 
respective regression results. Columns (1) and (5) contain variables concerning firm 
characteristics and general tax planning activities. The other columns also consider 
                                                          
21
 We require companies to have non-missing values for all components of the dependent and independent 
variables. However, visual inspection of several Form 10-k filings reveals that many of the missing values, 
especially for R&D expenses, in Compustat should be coded as zero. Therefore, we set missing R&D to 
zero. 
22
 Updated industry-classification can be downloaded from  
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages /faculty/ken.french/ Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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additional variables for international tax planning activities.
23
 Remember that a positive 
ETRDIFF is associated with aggressive international tax avoidance.  
First, we take into account the GAAP ETRDIFF in specifications (1) – (4). The 
GAAP ETR is defined as total taxes divided by pre-tax profit less extraordinary items. 
Accordingly, our GAAP ETRDIFF measure considers a firm’s overall tax avoidance 
behavior and not exclusively foreign activities.  
Across all specifications, our analysis shows a positive effect of SIZE on the 
GAAP ETRDIFF. This result refers to the political power theory (Siegfried, 1972). 
Larger firms have greater resources to influence political processes in a tax-efficient 
manner. Moreover, tax planning activities might be associated with economies of scale 
which leads to a more aggressive tax avoidance behavior. The variables 
PROFITABILITY and LEV only exert a weak and less robust negative influence on the 
GAAP ETRDIFF, whereas CAPINT is not significant at any conventional level. 
Interestingly, while the more general tax planning determinants do not provide a 
high explanatory power, the additional variables for international tax planning activities 
have highly significant effects on the GAAP ETRDIFF.  
Our results in Columns (2) – (4) of Table 3 support the expectation that 
international tax avoidance is significantly more aggressive if an MNE operates in tax 
haven countries. Comparing a firm not having any tax haven activities to a firm having 
these at sample mean of about 0.2208 [cf. Appendix 2, Panel A], our prediction for 
                                                          
23
 Due to missing data in Compustat Global for our German sample, we do not consider the influence of 
tax loss carry forwards in our analysis. However, the results stay robust if we include a dummy variable 
which equals one if there has been a decrease in tax loss carry forwards (tlcf) from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal 
year t and zero otherwise.  
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GAAP ETRDIFF  is about 1.9 percentage points higher if we consider, for example, the 
coefficient of 0.085 for the variable HAVEN in columns (4).   
Recent evidence suggests that multinationals can particularly shift some types of 
taxable profits that are more mobile. Therefore, we analyze whether the GAAP 
ETRDIFF is larger if income is supposed to be highly mobile by adding the variables 
INCOME MOBILE and R&D. Indeed, we find a positive and significant effect of both 
variables on the GAAP ETRDIFF in all specifications. Considering the coefficient 0.396 
of the variable R&D in column (4) we find that evaluated at sample mean, R&D intense 
firms have a higher GAPP ETRDIFF of approximately 1.1 percentage points                
[cf. Appendix 2, Panel A]. 
In specifications (5) – (8) of Table 3, we examine the Foreign ETRDIFF as 
dependent variable to focus more on international tax avoidance. The Foreign ETR is the 
quotient between the sum of foreign current taxes and foreign deferred income taxes and 
foreign pre-tax income. Interestingly, in contrast to our findings regarding the GAAP 
ETRDIFF, the more general firm characteristics have a highly significant influence on 
the Foreign ETRDIFF. Across all specifications, PROFITABILITY exerts a strong 
positive effect on the Foreign ETRDIFF. This positive relationship is very reasonable 
because more profitable firms have more opportunities and incentives to reduce tax 
expenses by engaging in tax avoidance, e.g., widely used transfer pricing methods such 
as the cost plus method, the resale pricing method or the transactional net margin 
method are associated with particular profit-shifting opportunities if profitability is 
abnormally high.  
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CAPINT exerts a negative and significant influence on Foreign ETRDIFF in all 
specifications. The negative effect suggests less aggressive tax avoidance if a firm has a 
high level of property, plant and equipment which is in line with the expectation that 
profit-shifting is more associated with intangibles.  
In addition, LEV has a negative and significant influence on the Foreign ETRDIFF 
which shows that the foreign pre-tax profits are more reduced by the deductibility of the 
interest payments than the tax expenses. 
Especially the Foreign ETRDIFF allows a detailed analysis of the effects of 
enhanced international tax planning activities. Results depicted in columns (6) – (8) 
confirm that aggressive international tax avoidance is positively associated via the 
membership to income mobile industries, the use of tax havens, and profit-shifting 
opportunities. The coefficients, especially for the variable HAVEN, are higher compared 
to the GAAP ETRDIFF. Evaluated at sample means (0.2152), tax havens are responsible 
for an increase in Foreign ETRDIFF of 5.8 percentage points [cf. Appendix 2, Panel B]. 
Moreover, in column (8), INCOME MOBILE is associated with a Foreign 
ETRDIFF that is 4 percentage points higher. Taking into consideration the coefficient of 
0.432 for the variable R&D in column (8) of Table 3, we receive an additional effect of 
approximately 2 percentage points on the FOREIGN ETRDIFF for a firm with an R&D 
intensity that is one standard deviation higher [cf. Appendix 2, Panel B]. 
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TABLE 3: GAAP and Foreign ETRDIFF – U.S. Sample 
Notes: Table 3 presents results of OLS regressions with the GAAP ETRDIFF in columns (1) – (4) and Foreign ETRDIFF in columns (5) – (8) as dependent variables.                                
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %,  
respectively.
 U.S. Firms GAAP ETRDIFF Foreign ETRDIFF 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SIZE 0.0076** 0.0066* 0.0090** 0.0082** 0.0088 0.0092 0.0140** 0.0122** 
  (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0062) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0058) 
PROFITABILITY -0.0583 -0.0678 -0.1020** -0.0997** 0.2770*** 0.2750*** 0.2770*** 0.2730*** 
  (0.0505) (0.0495) (0.0500) (0.0505) (0.0830) (0.0796) (0.0801) (0.0795) 
CAPINT -0.0275 -0.0197 -0.0174 -0.0155 -0.100*** -0.0799*** -0.0776*** -0.0736*** 
  (0.0170) (0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0167) (0.0265) (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0246) 
LEV -0.0682* -0.0562 -0.0719* -0.0592 -0.1700** -0.1430** -0.1690** -0.1390** 
  (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0408) (0.0412) (0.0804) (0.0706) (0.0684) (0.0705) 
HAVEN   0.0863** 0.0864** 0.0851**   0.2670*** 0.2700*** 0.2680*** 
    (0.0366) (0.0370) (0.0365)   (0.0647) (0.0617) (0.0635) 
INCOME MOBILE   0.0424*** 
 
0.0218*   0.0661*** 
 
0.0428** 
    (0.0112) 
 
(0.0118)   (0.0185) 
 
(0.0193) 
R&D   
 
0.5090*** 0.3960***   
 
0.6070*** 0.4320*** 
    
 
(0.1080) (0.1170)   
 
(0.1290) (0.1330) 
CONSTANT -0.0069 -0.0197 -0.0395 -0.0337 0.00537 -0.0571 -0.1060* -0.0921 
  (0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0383) (0.0385) (0.0573) (0.0569) (0.0569) (0.0579) 
Industry-FE         
Year-FE         
N 2,422 2,422 2,422 2,422 1,760 1,760 1,760 1,760 
R² 0.141 0.173 0.181 0.185 0.176 0.239 0.241 0.250 
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2.4.3. Tax Avoidance Determinants for German Firms 
Equivalent to our U.S. firms we also use the sample of German firms to analyze 
determinants of tax avoidance. We again consider the GAAP ETRDIFF as dependent 
variable. As explained in Section 2.3.2, we are unfortunately not able to compute the 
foreign ETRDIFF measures for the German firms. Table 4 shows the regression results 
considering the same variable specifications as in Table 3.  
 TABLE 4: GAAP ETRDIFF – German Sample 
German Firms GAAP ETRDIFF 
  1 2 3 4 
SIZE -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0022 -0.0019 
  (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0049) 
PROFITABILITY 0.1640 0.2020** 0.2170** 0.2240** 
  (0.1010) (0.0965) (0.0966) (0.0973) 
CAPINT -0.0084 0.0133 0.0083 0.0129 
  (0.0335) (0.0341) (0.0310) (0.0321) 
LEV -0.0127 0.0009 0.0326 0.0327 
  (0.0854) (0.0893) (0.0949) (0.0939) 
HAVEN 
 
0.1840** 0.2310*** 0.2220*** 
  
 
(0.0841) (0.0777) (0.0788) 
INCOME MOBILE 
 
0.0456** 
 
0.0190 
  
 
(0.0230) 
 
(0.0215) 
R&D 
  
0.6280*** 0.5620*** 
  
  
(0.1880) (0.2030) 
CONSTANT 0.0250 -0.0021 -0.0309 -0.0342 
  (0.0711) (0.0690) (0.0766) (0.0756) 
Industry-FE     
Year-FE     
N 562 562 562 562 
R² 0.115 0.140 0.157 0.159 
Notes: Table 4 presents results of OLS regressions with the GAAP ETRDIFF as dependent variable.                               
Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and 
*** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
 
Comparable to our findings for the U.S. firms, we find that the additional variables 
for international tax planning activities provide high explanatory power on the        
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GAAP ETRDIFF of German MNEs, whereas the more general tax planning 
determinants only have a weak significant influence. Only PROFITABILITY exerts a 
significant positive influence in columns (2) – (4).  
Especially for the variables R&D and HAVEN, we can confirm a strong positive 
influence indicating that German firms are also engaged in international tax avoidance. 
Evaluated at sample means (0.029), we find that R&D intensive firms have a higher 
GAAP ETRDIFF of approximately 1.6 percentage points. Considering the coefficient 
0.222 operations in tax havens even lead to an increase in GAAP ETRDIFF of about 2.7 
percentage points [cf. Appendix 2, Panel C]. The effect of INCOME MOBILE is not 
robust across all specifications. However, this finding might be attributed to our smaller 
sample for German MNEs including only 77 observations for income mobile firms. 
If we compare the results for U.S. and German firms, we receive comparable 
effects for the influence of certain tax planning characteristics if we consider the     
GAAP ETRDIFF. We find an even higher significant impact for the U.S. sample if we 
consider the Foreign ETRDIFF. Our results show that the investigated tax planning 
characteristics exert similar influence on the amount of international tax avoidance of 
U.S. and German MNEs. Nevertheless, our analysis of the total amount of aggressive 
international tax avoidance in Section 2.3 suggests that U.S. MNEs are particularly 
successful in aggressive tax avoidance. The additional amount of tax avoidance, 
however, might be attributed to more complex and less observable tax planning 
strategies like check-the-box or different definitions of residence.   
 
  
  
47 
 
2.4.4. Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance 
We provide additional regressions using alternative measures of tax avoidance that 
have been used in the literature. First, in accordance with prior studies, we consider the 
Current ETR (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Rego, 2003; Markle and Shackelford, 2012a, 
2012b) and the Cash ETR (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008) for the construction of 
our ETRDIFF
 
measure. The alternative ETRDIFF measures are used to run additional 
regressions as depicted in Table 5.    
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 5 indicate regression results regarding Current 
ETRDIFF as dependent variable. The Current ETR includes only current tax expenses in 
the numerator; the Foreign Current ETR is defined as the quotient between foreign 
current income taxes and foreign pre-tax income. Columns (1) and (2) show the findings 
for the Current ETRDIFF and the Foreign Current ETRDIFF for the U.S. sample. 
Column (3) contains regression results for the German sample using Current ETRDIFF.  
Regarding the Foreign Current ETRDIFF the results for the influence of 
aggressive international tax planning are very similar compared with the results for our 
basic specification of Foreign ETRDIFF in Table 3. We receive a positive and 
significant impact for all proxies of international tax planning activities. However, if we 
consider the findings for the Current ETRDIFF, we only find a significant effect of 
operations in tax havens. Similar to the GAAP ETRDIFF analysis, the                   
Current ETRDIFF provides comparable results for both data samples. 
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TABLE 5: Current and Cash ETRDIFF Measures 
Notes: Table 5 presents results of OLS regressions with the Current ETRDIFF and Foreign Current ETRDIFF in columns (1) – (3) and the Cash ETRDIFF in columns (4) – (5) as    
dependent variables. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. All specifications include a constant. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
  U.S. Firms German Firms U.S. Firms German Firms  
 
Current 
ETRDIFF 
Foreign Current 
ETRDIFF 
Current 
ETRDIFF 
Cash  
ETRDIFF 
Cash  
ETRDIFF 
  1 2 3 4 5 
SIZE 0.0086 0.0086 -0.0241*** 0.0078 -0.0075 
 
(0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0084) (0.0053) (0.0056) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0392 0.3010*** 0.3830** 0.1170 0.0572 
 
(0.0825) (0.0826) (0.1460) (0.0834) (0.0881) 
CAPINT 0.0057 -0.0287 0.0228 -0.0045 -0.0045 
 
(0.0205) (0.0253) (0.0395) (0.0213) (0.0289) 
LEV -0.1670** -0.1590* -0.0212 -0.0638 -0.0156 
 
(0.0654) (0.0805) (0.1250) (0.0524) (0.1650) 
HAVEN 0.1370*** 0.2470*** 0.3280*** 0.1690*** 0.1860* 
 
(0.0449) (0.0661) (0.1110) (0.0495) (0.1010) 
INCOME MOBILE 0.0040 0.0441** -0.0228 0.0318** 0.0219 
 
(0.0159) (0.0193) (0.0491) (0.0157) (0.0261) 
R&D 0.1880 0.4790*** 0.5880 0.1600 0.4740** 
 
(0.1490) (0.1380) (0.3830) (0.1470) (0.2160) 
Industry-FE      
Year-FE      
N 2,228 1,963 354 2,351 527 
R² 0.127 0.179 0.495 0.153 0.186 
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Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5 show the results for the Cash ETRDIFF as 
dependent variable for U.S. and German MNEs.
24
 The numerator of the Cash ETR is 
computed by using cash taxes paid. 
Again, we find similar results for both samples. While the more general tax 
planning determinants do not exert any influence on the Cash ETRDIFF, almost all 
proxies for international tax planning opportunities have a significant positive impact. 
Table 6 presents additional regressions using the well-known ETR measures as 
dependent variable. In correspondence with our main regression results in Sections 2.4.2 
and 2.4.3, we consider the GAAP ETR and the Foreign ETR. Note that we expect the 
opposite effects for potential determinants of tax avoidance due to the different 
definition of the ETR.       
Concerning the impact of general firm characteristics, the results in Table 6 show 
similar effects for ETRs for U.S. and German MNEs compared to our results for the 
ETRDIFF measures in Tables 3 and 4. Considering our proxies for aggressive 
international tax planning strategies, we receive similar results for the Foreign ETR and 
Foreign ETRDIFF. However, we get more robust results if we consider the                       
GAAP ETRDIFF instead of the GAAP ETR for both the U.S. and German sample. We 
therefore conclude that the ETRDIFF measures are not only more sufficient to measure 
the amount of aggressive tax avoidance but also helpful to analyze the influence of 
certain tax planning strategies.  
 
 
                                                          
24
 Unfortunately, information on foreign cash taxes is not available in Compustat North America and in 
Compustat Global. 
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TABLE 6: ETR Measures 
  U.S. Firms German Firms  
  GAAP ETR Foreign ETR GAAP ETR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE -0.0101*** -0.0107*** -0.0103* -0.0130** -0.0012 -0.0021 
  (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0049) 
PROFITABILITY 0.0021 0.0489 -0.2890*** -0.2820*** -0.1660* -0.2150** 
  (0.0453) (0.0458) (0.0798) (0.0780) (0.0999) (0.0977) 
CAPINT 0.0302** 0.0182 0.0919*** 0.0689*** 0.0057 -0.0133 
  (0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0234) (0.0223) (0.0308) (0.0304) 
LEV 0.0416 0.0176 0.1460** 0.1050 0.0109 -0.0198 
  (0.0383) (0.0377) (0.0717) (0.0659) (0.0904) (0.0986) 
HAVEN   -0.0128 
 
-0.1700***   -0.1380* 
    (0.0280) 
 
(0.0530)   (0.0792) 
INCOME MOBILE  -0.0218**  -0.0418**   -0.0317 
   (0.0110)  (0.0181)   (0.0249) 
R&D  -0.3820***  -0.3970***   -0.3130 
   (0.1160)  (0.1340)   (0.1960) 
Industry-FE       
Year-FE       
N 2,422 2,422 1,760 1,760 562 562 
R² 0.170 0.203 0.202 0.252 0.093 0.118 
Notes: Table 6 presents results of OLS regressions with the GAAP ETR and Foreign ETR as dependent variables for 
the U.S and Germany. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. All specifications include a 
constant. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, 
respectively. 
 
2.4.5. Alternative Tax Level Benchmark  
Our ETRDIFF captures the aggressive part of international tax avoidance as the 
difference between an ETR and a firm’s individual benchmark tax level (STR) in the 
absence of any profit-shifting or enhanced tax avoidance activity. So far, we have 
considered the mean of the statutory corporate tax rates of all host countries of a firm as 
the respective benchmark tax level. In additional robustness checks, we apply the 
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alternative weighting schemes to compute the benchmark tax level used for the 
ETRDIFF measures which we have introduced in Section 2.3.3.   
We compute the GAAP ETRDIFF and the Foreign ETRDIFF using this alternative 
weighting scheme for STR taking into account sales of subsidiaries. Table 7 depicts 
regression results using the adjusted ETRDIFF measures for the U.S. sample in columns 
(1) – (4) and for the German firms in columns (5) – (6). The regression results in Table 7 
are qualitatively very similar to the findings for our standard definition of the ETRDIFF 
measures (cf. Tables 3 and 4).  
We conclude that our standard definition of the ETRDIFF is already helpful to 
detect determinants of international tax avoidance, while a more refined definition of the 
benchmark tax level of the firm might be helpful to better infer the amount of aggressive 
tax avoidance.   
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TABLE 7: Alternative Benchmark Tax Levels – ETRDIFF adjusted 
  U.S. Firms German Firms 
  
GAAP ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
Foreign ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
GAAP ETRDIFF 
adjusted 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
SIZE 0.0074** 0.0080** 0.0082 0.0115** -0.0032 -0.0026 
  (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0063) (0.0058) (0.0051) (0.0048) 
PROFITABILITY -0.0452 -0.0872* 0.2810*** 0.2760*** 0.1620 0.2160** 
  (0.0502) (0.0500) (0.0834) (0.0798) (0.0989) (0.0968) 
CAPINT -0.0291* -0.0169 -0.0995*** -0.0728*** -0.0053 0.0154 
  (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0269) (0.0250) (0.0330) (0.0320) 
LEV -0.0678* -0.0557 -0.1670** -0.1350* -0.0025 0.0348 
  (0.0392) (0.0397) (0.0810) (0.0699) (0.0898) (0.0997) 
HAVEN   0.0770**   0.2630***   0.2000** 
    (0.0346)   (0.0626)   (0.0794) 
INCOME MOBILE   0.0243**   0.0445**   0.0250 
    (0.0117)   (0.0195)   (0.0221) 
R&D   0.3840***   0.4210***   0.4230** 
    (0.1180)   (0.1350)   (0.2000) 
Industry-FE 
      
Year-FE 
      
N 2,422 2,422 1,760 1,760 562 562 
R² 0.143 0.187 0.168 0.241 0.113 0.147 
Notes: Table 7 presents results of OLS regressions with the adjusted GAAP ETRDIFF and adjusted Foreign 
ETRDIFF as dependent variables for the U.S. and Germany. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in 
parentheses. All specifications include a constant. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
 
2.5.     Conclusion 
Our study proposes a new measure for the aggressive part of international tax 
avoidance. The ETRDIFF measure is the difference between the average of the statutory 
tax rates imposed by all countries worldwide that host a subsidiary of the respective 
MNE and an ETR of the firm.  Accordingly, we characterize an MNE as tax aggressive 
if its ETR is abnormally low compared to a firm’s individual benchmark that would be 
  
53 
 
expected in the absence of any profit-shifting strategies and additional subsidiaries in tax 
haven countries.  
We compute our new ETRDIFF measure for a sample of S&P 500 firms and for a 
comparable sample of German listed firms. We use the fact that listed firms are already 
obliged to publish a list of their significant subsidiaries. In particular for the U.S. firms, 
we find significant positive values for the ETRDIFF measures suggesting additional tax 
avoidance beyond the benchmark tax level of the firms.  
In additional regression analyses, we investigate which firm characteristics and tax 
planning opportunities affect the scope of international tax avoidance. Our findings 
reveal that aggressive international tax avoidance is determined by tax haven operations 
and opportunities to manipulate transfer prices. We conclude that the ETRDIFF 
measures are not only sufficient to measure the amount of aggressive tax avoidance but 
also helpful to analyze the influence of certain tax planning strategies.  
Our findings can contribute to the recent debate about base erosion and profit-
shifting. Very recently, the OECD has requested new measures to analyze the scope and 
the determinants of base erosion and profit-shifting. The methodology proposed in this 
paper allows to isolate the aggressive part of international tax avoidance and to identify 
important determinants such as tax haven usage and opportunities to manipulate transfer 
prices.  
In additional computations, we approximate the economic relevance of the 
subsidiaries by sales data taken from FDI statistics and provide adjusted values for our 
ETRDIFF measures. However, the differences between adjusted and unadjusted 
ETRDIFF measures are small. Although the regression results suggest that our standard 
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definition of the ETRDIFF is already helpful to detect determinants of international tax 
avoidance, a more refined definition of the benchmark tax level of the firm would be 
helpful to better infer the amount of aggressive tax avoidance. Therefore, if data from a 
detailed country-by-country reporting as discussed at the OECD (2013) were available, 
computation of benchmark tax levels could be augmented by firm-level information 
about the economic relevance of subsidiaries. This would further improve the 
measurement of the aggressive part of international tax avoidance. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi)  
GAAP ETRDIFF STR – GAAP ETR   
Current ETR  txc / (pi – xi)  
Current ETRDIFF STR – Current ETR 
Cash ETR txpd / (pi – xi)  
Cash ETRDIFF STR – Cash ETR 
Foreign ETR (txfo + txdfo) / pifo 
Foreign ETRDIFF STR – Foreign ETR   
Foreign Current ETR  txfo / pifo 
Foreign Current ETRDIFF  STR – Foreign Current ETR  
STR Worldwide average of the statutory corporate income tax 
rates of all countries where subsidiaries are located  
SIZE log (at)  
PROFITABILITY pi / at 
CAPINT ppeveb / at (Compustat North America); ppegt / at 
(Compustat Global) 
LEV dlc / at 
HAVEN Number of tax havens in which the group has 
subsidiaries scaled by total number of countries in which 
the company operates in 
INCOME MOBILE Dummy, which is one if the SIC Codes of the parent is: 
283, 357, 367, 737, or 738 
R&D xrd / at 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
PANEL A: U.S. Sample – GAAP ETR and GAAP ETRDIFF 
U.S. Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
GAAP ETR 2,422 0.3028 0.1002 0.0005 0.9818 
STR 2,422 0.3207 0.0367 0.2059 0.4159 
GAAP ETRDIFF 2,422 0.0179 0.1042 -0.6975 0.3855 
SIZE 2,422 9.3512 1.3276 6.4483 13.9294 
PROFITABILITY 2,422 0.1134 0.0709 0.0012 0.5243 
CAPINT 2,422 0.4771 0.3539 0.0030 1.7698 
LEV 2,422 0.0429 0.0757 0 0.7142 
INCOME MOBILE 2,422 0.2180 0.4130 0 1 
R&D 2,422 0.0284 0.0426 0 0.2830 
HAVEN 2,422 0.2208 0.1377 0 0.7500 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis regarding the 
GAAP ETRDIFF. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
PANEL B: U.S. Sample – Foreign ETR and Foreign ETRDIFF 
U.S. Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
FOREIGN ETR 1,760 0.2616 0.1495 0.0014 0.9837 
STR 1,760 0.3117 0.0322 0.2400 0.4118 
FOREIGN ETRDIFF 1,760 0.0502 0.1529 -0.6890 0.4051 
SIZE 1,760 9.3230 1.3227 6.4484 13.9287 
PROFITABILITY 1,760 0.1047 0.0843 -0.4671 0.4676 
CAPINT 1,760 0.4759 0.3419 0.0044 1.7698 
LEV 1,760 0.0425 0.0703 0 0.6286 
INCOME MOBILE 1,760 0.2733 0.4458 0 1 
R&D 1,760 0.0367 0.0499 0 0.6799 
HAVEN 1,760 0.2152 0.1187 0 0.7500 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis regarding the 
Foreign ETRDIFF. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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PANEL C: German Sample – GAAP ETR and GAAP ETRDIFF 
German Sample Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
GAAP ETR 562 0.3052 0.1251 0.0034 0.9894 
STR 562 0.2748 0.0299 0.1782 0.4031 
GAAP ETRDIFF 562 -0.0304 0.1293 -0.7323 0.3062 
SIZE 562 7.7901 1.9732 3.7667 12.6432 
PROFITABILITY 562 0.0946 0.0795 0.0024 0.5371 
CAPINT 562 0.4445 0.3043 0.0019 1.7099 
LEV 562 0.0580 0.0745 0 0.7680 
INCOME MOBILE 562 0.1370 0.3442 0 1 
R&D 562 0.0290 0.0387 0 0.2508 
HAVEN 562 0.1249 0.0876 0 0.4000 
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis regarding the 
GAAP ETRDIFF. Variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the impact of recapitalizations on banks’ tax planning activities. Our 
empirical analysis uses a unique hand-collected firm-level data set of 93 banks located in 
10 OECD countries which received public funds in form of capital injections. Tax 
aggressiveness is measured based on banks’ effective tax rates (ETRs). Since treatment 
status is not random, we obtain a control group as similar to our treated group as 
possible by employing propensity score matching. Using a difference-in-differences 
approach we compare changes of banks’ tax planning behavior before and after 
receiving government support. The main finding indicates a positive impact of 
recapitalizations on banks’ ETRs. Before banks received capital injections we measure 
lower ETRs and thus, more tax aggressiveness for receiving banks. In 2011, however, 
the ETRs of the treated and control group converge. Our findings are robust against 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Key Words: International Tax Planning, Recapitalization, Financial Sector, Propensity 
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3.1. Introduction 
“Although participation in the program was not necessary from a capital adequacy 
perspective, as our capital position was strong, it was determined to be financially 
beneficial and provided U.S. Bancorp with the ongoing capacity for additional loan 
growth and for funding growth initiatives.” 
U.S. Bancorp Annual Report, 2008 
The financial crisis in 2008/2009 caused intensive liquidity issues for banks in 
various countries. Fearing an even more severe effect on the overall economy, many 
governments bailed out banks to stabilize the financial sector. As there was no 
coordinated approach, the design of these rescue packages varied among countries.
25
 
Nevertheless, a rough classification can be made between guarantees and capital 
injections. Guarantees on bank credits were given by several governments in an attempt 
to calm down markets and increase vanishing liquidity. However in some cases, this was 
not enough to save institutions from bankruptcy. Therefore, as an additional instrument 
capital was given to institutions in financial disrupt.  
With this being the most extensive and costly form of support and also attracting 
attention from tax payers, a broad discussion on banks’ responsibility for the crisis and 
the necessity of government rescue packages followed. Public opinion was highly 
critical suspecting moral hazard among banks being one major trigger. Being considered 
too big to fail for a long time, financial institutions were able to profit from a lower risk 
                                                          
25
 A valuable overview is given by Panetta et al. (2009). 
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premium due to assumed government support in case of bankruptcy.
26
 This is suspected 
to lead banks to engage in high risk transactions to maximize their profits while shifting 
costs of default towards the tax payer. However, one could also argue that banks 
substantially contribute to tax revenue and countries’ welfare and therefore deserve to be 
rescued. Whereas there seems to be some agreement on the necessity of bailouts since 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the discussion on lessons to be learned 
from the crisis has targeted various topics.  
In this context, public debate has focused mainly on (recapitalized) banks’ 
business models and compensation plans; however, banks’ role as tax payers was widely 
ignored. This is surprising, since one major aspect of the discussion was how the crisis 
related costs could be shifted towards the financial sector. Existing empirical studies 
already investigated recapitalized banks concerning bank lending (Mariathasan and 
Merrouche, 2012; Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter, 2013) and risk taking behavior (Brei 
and Gadanecz, 2012). However, although there is some evidence of banks’ tax 
aggressiveness in general (Keen and de Mooij, 2012; Heckemeyer and de Mooij, 2013; 
Huizinga, Voget and Wagner, 2014), there is so far no research on the link between 
recapitalized banks and their tax strategy. For this purpose, the recent financial crisis 
gives us optimal conditions to evaluate a change in tax aggressiveness of troubled banks 
before and after the crisis. 
In contrast to other rescue packages (e.g. guarantees) capital injections give 
governments shareholder power. The previous literature shows an impact of government 
ownership on corporations’ behavior. Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2013) find that 
                                                          
26
 O’Hara and Shaw (1990) provide an early study of this effect, more recent Acharya, Anginer and 
Warburton (2013). 
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government-owned banks have a different risk taking behavior than private banks. Other 
studies report a change in tax aggressiveness due to ownership structure and corporate 
governance influence (Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007; Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; 
Chen et al., 2010; Chyz et al., 2013). We want to contribute to this discussion by 
investigating the influence of government support on banks’ tax planning behavior. 
Results of our study can give us some insight into whether capital injections should be 
tied to additional conditions in the future.  
In our empirical analysis we use consolidated balance sheet and income statement 
information from the Bankscope Database provided by Bureau van Dijk for 856 
multinational banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries. We manually identify 93 
banks that received government support during the financial crisis. Our study applies 
propensity score matching in a difference-in-differences framework (DID-PSM 
approach) and contributes to recent studies applying propensity score matching in the 
context of taxation (Wamser, 2008; Finke, 2014). 
We investigate the influence of recapitalization by comparing the change in the tax 
aggressiveness, as measured by the effective tax rate (ETR), of rescued banks between 
2007 and 2011 to the counterfactual trend of a control group that consists of non-rescued 
banks. Our results provide evidence that the recapitalizations caused a significant change 
in the tax aggressiveness of rescued banks. Recapitalized banks had significantly lower 
ETRs measured one year before the financial crisis. However, rescued and non-rescued 
banks’ ETRs converge after the financial crisis. We associate the change in tax 
aggressiveness with an increased shareholder power and influence of the government 
associated with capital injections.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, a discussion of 
the relationship between banks’ international tax planning and recapitalization measures 
in the previous literature is provided. Section 3.3 shows an overview of our data set. 
Section 3.4 describes the methodology, i.e., the matching procedure. Here, we also 
assess the matching quality which is a prerequisite for drawing valid conclusions. 
Empirical results are presented in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2. Recapitalization and International Tax Planning of Banks 
The aim of this study is to link banks’ tax aggressiveness with capital injections 
during the financial crisis. We want to investigate whether receiving government support 
had any impact on banks’ tax planning activities.  
As a reaction to the events of the financial crisis many banks announced plans to 
change their corporate culture. Some of these changes were not merely voluntary, but a 
reaction to conditions tied to the respective support measure. Most rescue packages 
entailed specific conditions targeting remuneration and lending policy. To enforce these 
conditions governments implemented additional monitoring options. As an example, the 
U.S. Treasury demanded to send an observer if certain conditions were not met.
27
 
However, none of the recapitalization schemes we analyze had any specific tax 
conditions attached to receiving capital.   
We want to emphasize the importance of this point for two reasons. First, most 
headquarters of multinational banks are located in rather high-tax jurisdictions such as 
the U.S. and the U.K.; therefore, tax avoidance equals a reduction in tax revenue in these 
                                                          
27
 Members of the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) agreed to allow a government-appointed observer in 
their board meetings in case of repayment delays. 
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countries.
28
 In contrast, the majority of rescue packages were issued to the respective 
headquarters of multinational banks – in high-tax jurisdictions. Thus, while tax revenue 
is shifted to favorable destinations, government support is received from generous 
governments at home. Second, a meaningful ex-post contribution of banks to the crisis-
related costs can most likely be collected in form of taxes. Therefore, banks’ tax 
aggressiveness after the crisis should be evaluated. Although previous literature has 
already investigated banks’ tax aggressiveness in general (Keen and de Mooij, 2012; 
Heckemeyer and de Mooij, 2013; Huizinga, Voget and Wagner, 2014), there is so far no 
research on the impact of recapitalization on tax planning strategies.  
Governments can be considered the largest minority shareholder in almost all 
corporations due to its tax claim on cash flows (Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007). 
Capital injections can be assumed to increase governments’ influence and supervision as 
shareholders. Since governments are receivers of tax payments, we expect them to 
attempt to limit tax planning of the respective bank. This assumption is supported by 
evidence on government ownership. Several studies report a change in bank risk 
(Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2013) and in tax aggressiveness (Desai, Dyck and 
Zingales, 2007; Desai and Dharmapala, 2008; Chen et al., 2010; Chyz et al., 2013) due 
to ownership structure and corporate governance influence. In addition, it can be 
assumed that banks profiting from government support were eager to reinstate their 
reputation; and, in response to public attention, reduced their degree of tax planning.  
However, it is also imaginable that banks do not show any loyalty and continue to 
engage in aggressive tax planning activities. This would show in smaller or at least 
unchanged ETRs. A potential reason could be that governments’ possibilities to monitor 
                                                          
28
 The average statutory tax rate in our sample is 27.94 %. 
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banks’ behavior were limited and not sufficient to influence banks’ tax planning. Studies 
using a similar data set found no evidence for a change in risk taking (Brei and 
Gadanecz, 2012). Tax avoidance strategy goes along with increased risk of future 
payments caused by tax audit detections. Banks staying risk prone in general might also 
continue their tax planning strategy. In consequence, it might be that tax aggressiveness 
did at least not decrease.  
We contribute to a number of studies investigating the effects of rescue packages 
on banks’ behavior. Panetta et al. (2009) give a valuable overview of governments’ 
rescue measures between 2008 and 2009. Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter (2013) and 
Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) document determinants of recapitalization and 
examine the effect rescue measures had on the supply of bank lending. They find similar 
results suggesting that only capital injections of a certain amount can be associated with 
loan growth. Focusing on market reactions to government measures, King (2009) finds 
that creditors benefited from rescue packages at the expense of shareholders. To the best 
of our knowledge, there is so far no research on the taxation and tax planning activities 
of recapitalized banks.  
As a measure of tax aggressiveness, we use the ETR disclosed in consolidated 
financial statements according to ASC 740 or IAS 12 (depending on the accounting 
standard), which is defined as the sum of current and deferred taxes divided by profit 
before tax. This commonly used proxy for tax avoidance is widely available to investors 
and to the public. It is a well-accepted measure for tax behavior in the previous literature 
(Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Due to missing tax data and incomplete group structure 
information in Bankscope we are not able to test further tax avoidance measures like the 
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Current or Cash ETR (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) or the new tax measure ETRDIFF 
(Herbert and Overesch, 2015). 
3.3. Data 
Key asset for the following analysis is the identification of recapitalization 
measures on individual bank level. This data was hand-collected for large multinational 
banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries for which public rescue information were 
available. Our control group consists of all other banks in the respective countries. As 
there is no comprehensible list of capital injections in general, we must rely on intensive 
research. In order to identify rescued banks, we use public sources (e.g., news reports, 
official websites of national authorities) and confirm our findings through banks’ annual 
reports. 
In total, we have collected information on 93 banks that received government 
support in form of capital in 2008 and/or 2009. By hand-collecting this unique data set 
we are able to differentiate between rescued and non-rescued banks for all major 
countries affected by the financial crisis. A bank must have received capital injections 
from a public fund to be considered recapitalized in our sample. There have been 
additional measures, such as guarantees, nevertheless for our study we focus only on 
capital injections.
29
 We do not include banks receiving guarantee measures in our 
analysis for two reasons. First, our research question assumes an increasing influence of 
governments on banks’ business decisions. Although there was a variety of measures 
valuable to banks, we believe that only an increasing shareholder power would give 
                                                          
29
 Capital injections came in the following forms: Common equity, Preference capital, Hybrid capital, 
Subordinated notes, Contribution to reserves, Conversion of subordinated debt into equity capital. 
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governments sufficient information and possibilities to influence banks’ tax avoidance 
strategies. Second, guarantee measures were often provided to the whole banking sector 
and therefore would have limited our control group of non-treated banks substantially.  
Our group of banks which did not receive government support consists of 763 
banks. Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the 10 countries in which the rescued and 
non-rescued banks are located.    
TABLE 1: Country Overview 
Country RECAP = 1 RECAP = 0 Total 
Germany 6 81 87 
France 6 148 154 
The Netherlands 3 46 49 
U.K. 5 150 155 
Ireland 2 23 25 
Belgium 3 27 30 
Luxembourg 1 19 20 
Austria 3 46 49 
Switzerland 1 73 74 
U.S. 63 150 213 
TOTAL 93 763 856 
Notes: Table 1 shows an overview where the rescued and non-rescued banks are located in our sample. 
 
For all 856 banks we collect balance sheet and income statement information from 
the Bankscope Database provided by Bureau van Dijk for the years 2007 and 2011.
30
 
We rely on consolidated statements because they provide relevant information on the 
internationally active banking groups’ tax burden. Moreover, public capital injections 
were typically given to consolidated entities, rather than subsidiaries or branches.  
                                                          
30
 For our robustness check, we also collected data for the year 2010 [cf. Section 3.5.2].  
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We conduct several data set adjustments. To obtain a sufficiently balanced sample, 
we restrict attention to the 150 largest banks in the U.S. and U.K.
31
 Moreover, 
recapitalizations are only considered if provided in 2008 and/or 2009. This is necessary 
to define a clear treatment window which enables us to analyze before and after 
treatment effects.
32
 Acquisitions in general pose no risk to our analysis, since tax 
aggressiveness is expected to be extended to a newly acquired entity. However, we 
eliminated banks from our sample which were nationalized, went bankrupt or merged to 
a new entity during the crisis. In addition, we eliminate loss banks as they have different 
tax planning strategies. ETRs
33
 with a negative component have a different 
interpretation and are therefore eliminated accordingly (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; 
Rego, 2003; Stickney and McGee, 1982; Zimmermann, 1983). 
3.4. Methodology  
3.4.1. Difference-in-Differences Propensity Score Matching Approach 
The optimal setting to investigate the effect of the governmental recapitalizations 
on banks’ tax aggressiveness would require observing each bank in both states (with and 
without treatment) in each period. However, as it is not possible to observe how the bank 
would have performed without receiving the treatment, the best alternative is to build an 
adequate control group that is similar to the treated group with respect to as many 
criteria as possible.  
                                                          
31
 In the U.S. more than 700 banks profited from CPP. Since data on smaller banks are limited we restrict 
our control group to the 150 largest banks, measured by total assets, to avoid a mix-up of both groups. The 
same was done for the U.K. 
32
 Rescue packages in Spain, for example, were still ongoing in 2012. Therefore, Spain is not included in 
our sample. In the case of Japan, the major earthquake of 2011 distorts results and led us to exclude 
Japanese banks. 
33
 To limit the influence of outliers, we winsorize the ETRs at the interval [0; 1]. 
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 Therefore, we identify banks which received recapitalization (RECAP=1) as our 
treatment group and assign banks which are not subject to treatment (RECAP=0) to our 
control group. We use propensity score matching which is a popular method to estimate 
causal effects and obtain a control group as similar to our treatment group as possible. 
This involves a two-step procedure: In the first step, we predict the probability of being 
treated by government support (propensity score) using a probit regression with respect 
to a vector of relevant pre-treatment observables Xi (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In 
our binary model the choice of the underlying model is relatively unproblematic 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008): 
                             p(Xi) = Pr (RECAPi=1| Xi) = ϕ (β0 + β1Xi)                     (1)     
In the second step, we match each treated bank (RECAP=1) to one or more non-
treated banks (RECAP=0), being sufficiently similar with respect to the observables Xi. 
The matching procedure is based on the propensity score from the first step. In our 
study, we use different matching algorithms to match the treated and the non-treated 
group in order to avoid bias due to the chosen matching method [cf. Section 3.5].  
Applying propensity score matching requires two assumptions to be fulfilled. First, 
for the probit regression the propensity score as a probability must lie between zero and 
one for both groups, i.e., banks with the same value of observables Xi have the identical 
positive probability of being both treated and non-treated (Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 
1999). This Common Support Condition ensures that only banks with suitable control 
units are considered: 
                             0 < Pr (RECAPi =1| Xi) <1                                             (2) 
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As the aim of applying propensity score matching is to avoid bias due to selection 
observables, the second main prerequisite for the application of propensity score 
matching is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). The CIA requires the 
selection into the group of recapitalized (RECAP=1) or non-recapitalized (RECAP=0) to 
be only driven by observables (a vector of characteristics Xi). This is to say that there 
exists a set Xi of observables such that after controlling for these characteristics, 
potential outcomes, in our case ETRs, are independent of treatment status, i.e., 
recapitalization status. It can then be assumed that this condition is exogenous: 
                           ETRi(1), ETRi(0)) ⊥ RECAPi| Xi                                             (3) 
Having obtained two groups only differing in their treatment status, we are able to 
compare banks’ tax aggressiveness. In order to capture a bank’s tax avoidance behavior 
we use ETRs as reported in the financial statements as outcome variable. A change in 
the outcome variable due to the treatment is usually called ATT (Average Treatment 
Effect on the Treated). Theoretically, this effect is the difference Δi between the tax 
aggressiveness ETRi(1) of a bank i which received government support and the tax 
aggressiveness of the same bank i in the hypothetical case of not receiving government 
support ETRi(0): 
                             Δi = ETRi(1) - ETRi(0)                                                                     (4) 
                          ATT = E(ETRi(1) - ETRi(0) | RECAP=1)                                  (5) 
However, this effect does not control for the counterfactual trend of both groups. 
Our study therefore applies a difference-in-differences framework (Heckman, Ichimura 
and Todd, 1998). According to the difference-in-differences method the effect of a 
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recapitalization treatment is identified by comparing the change in tax aggressiveness of 
the treatment group between two periods (here 2007 and 2011) to the counterfactual 
trend in tax aggressiveness they would have experienced in the absence of the treatment. 
The counterfactual trend is approximated by the actual change in tax aggressiveness of 
the control group between 2007 and 2011.  
 By forming “statistical twin pairs” before performing the DID estimator, 
propensity score matching makes the standard difference-in-differences assumption 
more plausible as the between-comparison removes common period effects that 
identically affect the treatment and control group. The plausibility of this common trend 
assumption is based on the similarity in propensity scores of treated and control group. 
Compared to the alternative of controlling linearly for the Xi observable variables in a 
DID regression, the DID-PSM approach has two advantages. It guarantees a more 
appropriate weighting of covariates and does not extrapolate beyond the region of 
common support avoiding comparison of non-comparable units.  
3.4.2. Selection of Relevant Characteristics 
A central issue for propensity score matching is the choice of observable variables 
driving the self-selection process and thus being relevant for computing the propensity 
score. Only variables that influence both the treatment decision and the outcome variable 
should be included.
34
 In addition, only variables that are unaffected by the treatment (or 
the anticipation of it) should be considered to avoid endogeneity problems. Therefore, 
                                                          
34
 Explanatory variables can be divided into three sets: (1) Covariates which strongly influence the 
treatment decision but weakly influence the outcome variable, (2) Covariates which are relevant to the 
outcome variable but irrelevant to the treatment decision and (3) Covariates which influence both. The 
propensity score estimation should at least include set (3) (Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001; Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). 
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we use the 2007 values of the covariates, i.e., the values before the financial crisis and 
government support for our matching procedure (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
In the propensity score matching we take into account banks’ characteristics that 
are expected to differ across the respective treatment and control groups. The DID-PSM 
approach allows us to balance the treatment and control group with respect to these 
characteristics making the common trend assumption more plausible. For this purpose, 
we follow Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) and Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter 
(2013) who investigate differences between rescued and non-rescued banks with a 
sample similar to ours. We can therefore rely on these results when determining relevant 
characteristics of recapitalized banks that can affect treatment assignment.  
We choose the variable SIZE, which is the sum of total assets and off-balance 
sheet items (in logs), as it is a potentially important factor in lending decisions. During 
the crisis, large banks were particularly affected by their lower deposit funding ratio. 
According to Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter (2013) recapitalized banks were on 
average twice the size as non-rescued banks. Therefore, we can expect a positive 
relationship between recapitalization status and bank size. We also add the variable ROA 
which is measured by adjusting net income with interest expenses divided by total assets 
as a proxy for profitability. High profits could lead banks to retain earnings and lower 
the leverage ratio. As a higher equity ratio could reduce the demand for external lending, 
we expect a negative correlation. In addition, we consider the variable LEVERAGE, 
which is the quotient between total liabilities and total assets, as the leverage ratio 
should have a positive influence on the recapitalization of a bank. LIQUIDITY, which is 
defined as liquid assets (including cash, trading securities and interbank lending with a 
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maturity of less than three months) divided by total assets, is also an important 
characteristic of rescued banks as their reliance on market funding before and during the 
crisis was generally higher (Brei, Gambacorta and von Peter, 2013). Liquidity should 
have a negative impact on the recapitalization status of a bank. Moreover, we add the 
variable COLLATERAL, which is a tangibility measure including total securities, 
treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, cash and due from banks, land and buildings and 
other tangible assets divided by the book value of assets (Gropp and Heider, 2010), in 
order to capture for banks’ specific asset structure. As a high level of tangibility makes 
external lending more attractive (easier access and lower costs), we expect a positive 
correlation with a bank’s recapitalization status, since lending conditions changed 
dramatically during the financial crisis. Finally, we take the variable LLP into 
consideration, which captures a bank’s accrual of loan loss provisions (in logs). Since 
banks with a high level of LLPs can be assumed to have a higher amount of defaulting 
credits, we expect a positive correlation with recapitalization status. 
The computation of the propensity score should also include determinants of the 
outcome variable ETR in addition to the drivers of the selection decision (Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd, 1998). In our study, there is some overlap of both groups of 
determinants. For example, prior studies find a significant influence of size and 
profitability (Zimmermann, 1983; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003; Rego, 
2003; Chen et al., 2010) on tax planning activities. In addition, leverage is associated 
with tax aggressiveness. Banks with a high level of debt can use the deductibility of 
interest expenses to reduce tax burden. However, the effect of leverage on the ETR is 
ambiguous since interest payments do not only reduce taxable profits, and thus, tax 
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expenditures, but also pre-tax earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Loan loss 
provisions’ tax deductibility varies by country, however the accrual of bad loans in high-
tax countries can be seen as a proxy for future deductions in case of credit default and 
therefore as a tax planning tool. 
Table 2 shows the means of the observable characteristics before matching. The 
comparison shows with the exception of ROA and COLLATERAL, both groups of banks 
are significantly different. These results underline the necessity to establish an adequate 
control group via propensity score matching. 
TABLE 2: Means of the Selected Observable Characteristics before Matching 
Characteristics RECAP = 1 RECAP = 0 t-stat p-value 
SIZE 11.4112 9.1208 -9.1402 0.0000 
ROA 0.0420 0.0804 0.5459 0.5853 
LEVERAGE 0.9194 0.8673 -2.9189 0.0036 
LIQUIDITY 0.1433 0.2435 3.7466 0.0002 
COLLATERAL 0.2890 0.2701 -0.7474 0.4550 
LLP 4.8272 3.2204 -6.4369 0.0000 
Notes: Table 2 compares the mean of selected characteristics between rescued banks (RECAP  = 1) and non-rescued 
banks (RECAP = 0) before matching in 2007.With the exception of ROE and COLLATERAL, the differences 
between both groups are highly significant.   
 
3.4.3. Estimating the Propensity Score 
We use the observable characteristics we derived in Section 3.4.2 to calculate the 
probability of receiving government support (propensity score). In accordance with 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), we estimate the propensity score by taking the 
determinants of a bank’s recapitalization and of the outcome, in our case tax 
aggressiveness (ETR), as explanatory variables [cf. Equation (1)]. In addition, as 
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Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) find an influence of different banks’ specializations, 
we ensure that only banks belonging to the same specialty are matched. 
Pr(RECAP) = β0 + β1log(SIZE) + β2ROA +  β3LEVERAGE + β4LIQUIDITY +    
                        β5COLLATERAL +   β6log(LLP) +  ɛ                                                    (6)                                           
Table 3 shows the coefficients of the probit regression. All determinants have the 
expected sign. The size of the coefficients cannot be directly interpreted as there are no 
marginal effects of the explaining variables on the dependent variable. However, this is 
not relevant here as the coefficients are exclusively used to calculate the propensity 
score. 
TABLE 3: Estimating the Propensity Score 
  Coefficient S.E. z P>|z| 
SIZE 0.2106 0.0809 2.60 0.009 
ROA -0.0530 0.6241 -0.08 0.932 
LEVERAGE 0.8909 1.6700 0.53 0.594 
LIQUIDITY -2.4570 0.6685 -3.68 0.000 
COLLATERAL 0.7076 0.5818 1.22 0.224 
LLP 0.0628 0.0616 1.02 0.308 
CONSTANT -4.1394 1.4610 -2.83 0.005 
Notes: Table 3 shows the coefficients of the probit regression.  
 
 
As the propensity score is a probability of receiving treatment given observed 
characteristics Xi, it has to be in the interval [0;1] [cf. Equation (2)]. In our sample, the 
average probability to participate in the treatment for all banks is 0.14. Based on the 
propensity score, we use for the matching in our study five to one nearest neighbor 
algorithm (with replacement) which assigns five of the closest non-treated observations 
to match the treated one. We choose this matching method as it is more reliable 
especially in small samples of treated units. It reduces the variability of the nearest 
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neighbor estimator in comparison to a one to one neighbor matching (Blundell and Dias, 
2008). To ensure matching quality we set the maximum caliper at 0.01. Due to the 
caliper, the propensity scores between treated and matched control banks do not deviate 
in absolute terms by more than 0.01.  
However, to show that the results are not driven by the applied matching 
algorithm, we also apply kernel matching and one to one nearest neighbor matching in 
Section 3.5. One to one nearest neighbor matching matches to each treated unit the 
control unit with the closest propensity score. Kernel matching uses weighted averages 
of all controls in order to match treated and control units. The shorter the distance 
between the treated and the control observation, the greater is the weight. Thus, this 
method can use more information as it reduces the variance of the estimation. 
3.4.4. Assessing Matching Quality 
Before we report the results with respect to our research question, we first provide 
information on the matching quality concerning the two main assumptions of propensity 
score matching – Conditional Independence Assumption and Common Support 
Condition [cf. Section 3.4.1]. The Conditional Independence Assumption cannot be 
directly tested, but several guidelines for model specification should be considered. 
Since we do not condition on all covariates but on the propensity score, we have to 
check if the matching procedure is able to adequately balance the distribution of these 
characteristics. For the validity of results it is important that the treated and control 
group are sufficiently similar after the matching. This prerequisite can be assessed in a 
balancing test by the standardized bias (SBx) for each variable. The SBx is calculated by 
dividing the difference between the mean characteristic of the treatment (?̅?𝑡𝑟) and 
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matched control group (?̅?𝑐𝑜) by the square root of the mean variance in each group 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) and expressed as a percentage: 
𝑆𝐵𝑥 = 100 ∗  
?̅?𝑡𝑟− ?̅?𝑐𝑜
√
𝜎𝑥𝑡𝑟
2 + 𝜎𝑥𝑐𝑜
2
2
 %                                         (7) 
Table 4 compares the means of all relevant characteristics between rescued banks 
and a control group which was determined via propensity score matching (five to one 
nearest neighbor caliper matching) before and after matching and displays the 
standardized bias for all observable variables.  
The results show that the propensity score matching succeeds at balancing the 
covariates and reducing the bias between banks with and without recapitalization. With 
the exception of ROA and LEVERAGE, all variables are significant before matching, i.e., 
the unmatched treatment and control group differ substantially. After matching the 
standardized bias should be about 5 % for the key variables as this indicates good 
matching quality. Otherwise the mean difference is considered quite large and may 
indicate a lack of balancing (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). The standardized biases are 
acceptable for all variables. By the matching, the differences between treatment group 
and non-treatment group are reduced considerably. An exception is the variable 
COLLATERAL. For this variable, the standardized bias is about 9 %. However, the two 
columns on the right hand side show that the difference in the variable COLLATERAL is 
not significant after matching which confirms that the variable is no longer an 
explanation for the recapitalization status of a bank.  
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TABLE 4: Assessment of Matching Quality 
Variable 
 Mean % %   
 Treated Control Bias 
Reduction 
(Bias) 
T p>|t| 
SIZE Unmatched 11.283 9.790 77.3  6.42 0.000 
 Matched 11.050 11.059 -0.5 99.4 -0.03 0.977 
ROA Unmatched 0.408 0.094 -9.3  -0.58 0.565 
 Matched 0.040 0.037 0.6 93.5 1.67 0.096 
LEVERAGE Unmatched 0.918 0.904 20.7  1.36 0.174 
 Matched 0.914 0.917 -4.3 79.2 -0.47 0.643 
LIQUIDITY Unmatched 0.135 0.178 -25.9  -1.97 0.049 
 Matched 0.122 0.129 -4.2 83.7 -0.29 0.773 
COLLATERAL Unmatched 0.267 0.227 27.3  2.01 0.045 
 Matched 0.253 0.267 -9.4 65.5 -0.63 0.533 
LLP Unmatched 4.827 3.226 77.3  6.42 0.000 
 Matched 4.648 4.699 -2.5 96.8 -0.14 0.891 
Notes: Table 4 compares the means of all relevant characteristics between rescued banks and a control group of non-
rescued banks which was determined by propensity score in 2007. The results are based on five to one nearest 
neighbor caliper matching.  
 
The bias reduction can also be illustrated graphically. Figure 1 compares the 
standardized bias before matching (indicated with points) to the standardized bias after 
matching (indicated with small crosses). The figure illustrates again the successful 
reduction in standardized bias due to the matching procedure. 
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FIGURE 1: Bias Reduction for Characteristics 
            
Notes: Figure 1 compares the standardized bias before matching to the standardized bias after 
matching for all selected characteristics. 
 
A further possibility to assess the quality of the matching consists in re-estimating 
the probit regression based on the matched sample. Table 5 illustrates again that the 
observable characteristics do not longer explain the recapitalization status of a bank. The 
explanatory power in terms of pseudo-R
2 
is reduced from 0.134 to 0.022 and the 
observables are not only separately insignificant as shown in Table 4 but also jointly 
insignificant (𝜌 > 𝑥2  = 0.675). Moreover, the table shows that the mean bias between 
the two groups before and after matching and across all characteristics is reduced from 
39.6 % to 3.6 %. As the mean standardized bias over all variables is below 5 %, we can 
again confirm a good matching quality.  
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Standardized % bias across covariates
LIQUIDITY
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Unmatched
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TABLE 5: Joint Insignificance of Observables after Matching 
  Pseudo-R² p > χ² 
            Bias 
Mean Median 
Raw 0.1340 0.000 39.6 26.6 
Matched 0.0220 0.675 3.6 3.4 
Notes: Table 5 shows that after matching observable characteristics do no longer provide joint explanatory power for 
recapitalization status. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. 
 
In addition, the Common Support Condition should be tested which ensures that 
there is a sufficient overlap of the propensity scores of the treated and non-treated group 
in order to find adequate matches. This can be done by visual inspection. Figure 2 shows 
that we can assume that the common support is given as there is a certain number of 
treated and non-treated banks between the interval [0;1] in each class of the propensity 
score. In addition, imposing the Common Support Condition only leads to the exclusion 
of a few treatment observations. 
FIGURE 2: Common Support Condition 
 
         Notes: Figure 2 illustrates that the propensity score as a probability lies between 
         zeroand one for  both groups (treated and untreated). 
0 .2 .4 .6
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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To conclude all information on the matching quality, we can show that through the 
propensity-score five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching, it was possible to 
generate a control group which is similar enough to the treatment group to be used to 
calculate the ATT using difference-in-differences method.  
3.5.   Empirical Analysis 
        3.5.1.  Main Results 
As we want to examine whether the tax aggressiveness of treated banks has 
changed in the years after they received governmental support, we use a DID-PSM 
approach (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998) to compare tax aggressiveness of 
recapitalized banks and banks not receiving government support. We take the outcome 
variable ETR as measure of banks’ tax avoidance in 2007, which is the year before the 
recapitalization occurred and compare it with the ETR in 2011. We choose 2011 instead 
of 2010 to allow for some time to successfully implement or change existing tax 
planning strategies after the financial crisis.
35
 Moreover, we assume that crisis-related 
balance sheet distortions have faded out until then.  
In particular, we calculate not only the ATT on the outcome variable ETR in 2007 
and 2011 but also the effect on the change in the outcome variable before and after the 
treatment. As derived in Section 3.4.1 the difference-in-differences matching relies on 
the assumption that the change in the outcome variable ETR between 2007 and 2011 
would be the same for the treatment and the control group in the absence of the 
recapitalization. This allows us to control for the notion that there may be unobserved 
differences between treated and untreated units. Thus, an advantage of the combination 
                                                          
35
 An estimation using 2010 instead of 2011 can be found in our robustness tests [cf. Section 3.5.2]. 
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of propensity score matching and difference-in-differences method is not only the 
potential selection of observables but also the elimination of time constant 
unobservables.  
The main result of the difference-in-differences analysis is presented in the last 
column of Table 6 and significant at 5 % level. It indicates a change in rescued banks’ 
tax aggressiveness, namely higher reported ETRs, caused by capital injections in 
2008/09. The effect is robust concerning time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.  
TABLE 6: Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007)                FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.251 -0.031* 0.252 0.274 0.022 0.053** 
Std. E (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) 
Notes: Table 6 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The 
outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in 
the control group 219, observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
The BASELINE columns contain the mean outcome for each group (control and 
treated) before recapitalization in 2007 and its difference. The mean ETR of the treated 
group is smaller (3.1 percentage points) which is an indicator for more tax planning 
activities. The difference between the means is significant at 10 % level and suggests 
that banks receiving public funds were on average more tax aggressive in 2007. The 
FOLLOW UP columns show the same information after the recapitalization. The results 
indicate that the ETRs of the treated and control group converge in 2011. The difference 
between the mean outcomes is now positive, but not statistically significant anymore. 
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This supports our assumption that increasing influence and supervision by governments 
and public attention lead to a reduction in banks’ tax aggressiveness. 
       3.5.2.  Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of our results, we carry out several additional analyses. To 
show that the results are not driven by the applied matching algorithm, we also test 
samples matched with one to one nearest neighbor and kernel matching. The results are 
shown in Tables 7 and 8 and confirm the results obtained with five to one nearest 
neighbor matching.  
TABLE 7: Difference-in-Differences Method – 1to1 NN-Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.299 0.251 -0.048* 0.252 0.274 0.022 0.070** 
Std. E (0.022) (0.013) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) (0.035) 
Notes: Table 7 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The 
outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on one to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in 
the control group 90, observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, 
** and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
 
 
TABLE 8: Difference-in-Differences Method – Kernel Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.274 0.251 -0.023* 0.256 0.274 0.018 0.041** 
Std. E (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) 
Notes: Table 8 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The 
outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on kernel matching. Observations in the control group 435, 
observations in the treatment group 133. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Again, we find a significant impact of the recapitalization status on the tax 
aggressiveness in 2007. The treated group has, on average, smaller ETRs. For the year 
2011, the difference of the mean ETRs is not significant. Additionally, we find again a 
significant effect in the difference-in-differences approach. 
We examine subsamples with respect to different regions to account for 
heterogeneity in our sample. Table 9 shows a difference-in-differences analysis when 
only recapitalized European banks are taken into account. We obtain highly significant 
positive effects at 1 % level for the year 2007, i.e., the mean ETR of treated group is      
9 percentage points smaller than the ETR of the respective control group. Again, we 
cannot find a significant effect of the recapitalization status on the tax aggressiveness in 
2011. Our results suggest that for European rescued banks tax aggressiveness was not 
only more pronounced than for non-rescued banks before the crisis, but that the effect is 
also time-constant. 
TABLE 9: European Sample – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-
Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.192 -0.090*** 0.252 0.296 0.044 0.134** 
Std. E (0.011) (0.023) (0.025) (0.011) (0.051) (0.052) (0.058) 
Notes: Table 9 considers a subsample of only European banks in the treated group. It shows the mean outcome for the 
treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based 
on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in the control group 219, observations in the treatment 
group 40. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
level, respectively. 
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When limiting our sample to U.S. based banks only, we are not able to identify 
any effect of capital injections on tax aggressiveness. Treatment and control group are 
very similar in respect to their tax aggressiveness before and after the financial crisis. 
This can be attributed to a number of causes. First, there was no condition concerning 
taxation implemented into recapitalization contracts. Second, although public attention 
and governments’ interest in supervision in the U.S. might have been of equal power; 
the total number of more than 700 capital injections complicated tight supervision and 
lowered public attention to the single bank. With being one among many banks 
behavioral incentive might be much lower. Third, whereas in most European countries 
only few banks with a supposedly risk prone management style were bailed out, in the 
U.S. the sample includes a bigger variety of business models.  
Table 10: U.S. Sample – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 NN-Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2011) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.260 0.283 0.022 0.269 0.267 -0.003 -0.025 
Std. E (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) 
Notes: Table 10 considers a subsample of only U.S. banks in the treated group. It shows the mean outcome for the 
treated and control group in 2007 and 2011 and its difference. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based 
on five to one nearest neighbor caliper matching. Observations in the control group 171, observations in the treatment 
group 93. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % 
level, respectively. 
 
  
Choosing our event window has great impact on our analysis. Capital injection 
programs allowed banks to pay back injected capital when possible on specific terms. 
Most banks were eager to pay back governments as soon as possible, not only to avoid 
government influence on their business decisions but also as a signal to their other 
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shareholders. Therefore, one could argue that 2011 is already too late to measure effects 
of government influence. To avoid this complication, we repeat our analysis choosing 
2010 instead of 2011 as our relevant after-crisis year.  
As shown in Table 11 our results are robust and indicate the same behavior of tax 
aggressiveness as we measured for 2011. 
TABLE 11: Robustness Test Year 2010 – Difference-in-Differences Method – 5to1 
NN-Matching 
 
 
BASELINE (2007) FOLLOW UP (2010) 
Outcome 
Variable 
Control Treated Diff(BL) Control Treated Diff(FU) 
DIFF-IN-
DIFF 
ETR 0.282 0.251 -0.031* 0.241 0.274 0.033 0.064* 
Std. E (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.028) (0.031) (0.036) 
Notes: Table 11 shows the mean outcome for the treated and control group in 2007 and 2010 and its difference for the 
entire sample. The outcome variable is the ETR. The results are based on five to one nearest neighbor caliper 
matching. Observations in the control group 222, observations in the treatment group 132.  Robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level, respectively. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
Our study investigates tax aggressiveness of banks which received public funds 
during the recent financial crisis.  
For the empirical analysis we use a unique hand-collected data sample of 93 
multinational banks headquartered in 10 OECD countries that received support in form 
of capital from public funds in 2008 and/or 2009. Our control group, which did not 
receive government support, consists of 763 banks in the respective countries.  
Using a DID-PSM approach we are able to compare tax aggressiveness of 
recapitalized banks with banks that did not receive support. Our main result indicates a 
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significant change in tax aggressiveness caused by capital injections that is robust 
concerning time-invariant unobserved effects. 
In addition, we explore the tax aggressiveness of both groups before (2007) and 
after the capital injections were received (2011). Our results show that banks receiving 
public funds in 2008 and/or 2009 had significantly lower ETRs measured one year 
before the financial crisis. However, after the recapitalization we cannot find significant 
different mean ETRs between the treated and control group anymore. We associate this 
result with increased government influence after strengthening its shareholder position 
by capital injections. 
Our findings are supported by a series of consistent robustness tests, applying a 
different event window and additional matching methods. Lastly, a closer look at our 
sample suggests that effects differ among countries. Whereas the effect is very 
pronounced in Europe, we do not find significant results for the U.S. subsample. 
Our study contributes to the recent discussions on possible ways to regulate banks’ 
behavior. Interestingly, we find that banks changed their tax aggressiveness even 
without contractual enforcement. However, this does not hold for the U.S., where the 
majority of recapitalized banks are located. We attribute this to the enormous size of the 
recapitalization program, taking attention away from the single bank.  
Several policy implications can be taken from our study. First, rescue measures 
offer an opportunity to address banks’ existent tax aggressiveness. Second, negative 
behavioral patterns such as excessive risk taking and tax avoidance might be highly 
correlated. Future regulatory approaches could therefore attempt to address both issues 
simultaneously.   
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Abstract:  
Our study analyzes the influence of public disclosure of group structures in Exhibit 21 
on the tax aggressiveness of U.S. multinational firms. Several U.S. multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have removed a substantial number of subsidiaries from their 
Exhibit 21 since 2008. Our analysis suggests that firms that decided to substantially 
reduce the number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21 avoid 
significantly more taxes compared to firms that did not change disclosure. Moreover, 
our study reveals that international tax avoidance by U.S. firms is associated with tax 
haven operations and profit-shifting opportunities. Our results suggest that publicly 
disclosed country-by-country information could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance 
behavior.  
 
Keywords: Effective Tax Rate, Tax Accounting, Tax Aggressiveness, International Tax 
Planning 
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4.1. Introduction 
It is well-known that multinational enterprises (MNEs) use different mechanisms 
to avoid taxes. Recent public discussion proposes the establishment of a country-by-
country reporting of key economic figures and tax payments to hinder tax avoidance. 
We analyze the relationship between public disclosure of group structures of U.S. MNEs 
and tax avoidance. Moreover, we investigate the influence of well-known determinants 
of international tax avoidance such as tax haven operations and profit-shifting 
opportunities. 
Aggressive tax avoidance of MNEs has received considerable attention recently. 
The debate has been stimulated by very low effective tax rates (ETRs) disclosed in 
consolidated financial statements of well-known firms. For example, Google Inc. paid 
only $0.36 billion foreign taxes on $8.1 billion of non-U.S. profits in 2012, resulting in a 
foreign tax rate lower than 5 %.
36
 As statutory tax rates on corporate income are 
significantly higher than 5 % in most industrialized countries, Google’s ETR does not 
reflect common expectations about the tax level imposed. The ongoing public discussion 
about specific MNEs avoiding taxes has triggered a claim for a country-by-country 
reporting of key economic indicators by MNEs (e.g., OECD, 2013; Tax Justice 
Network, 2014). In particular, a publicly disclosed country-by-country reporting might 
increase public pressure from customers or the general public, thereby limiting 
international tax avoidance. Currently, Amazon serves as a prominent example where 
public pressure due to accounting transparency leads to less tax avoidance. Under the 
pressure of E.U. authorities that investigate Amazon’s tax arrangements via subsidiary 
                                                          
36
 Cf. Google U.K. paid £11.2m in corporate tax, The Financial Times, 30/09/2013; 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6ff0ebc-29c4-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3O9jEfFE6. 
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locations especially in Luxembourg, the company has changed the way it books revenue 
from sales in Europe, a move that could lead to higher tax payments.
37
 
However, as U.S. MNEs are currently not obliged to disclose an entire country-by-
country reporting, empirical evidence on the effect of public disclosure of tax planning 
details on the scope of tax avoidance is still scarce. Only a small strand of previous 
research analyzes this relationship. The results of existing studies indicate that less 
public pressure concerning different types of country-by-country reporting leads to more 
aggressive tax behavior (e.g., Hope, Ma and Thomas, 2013; Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde, 
2014).  
Our paper contributes to this literature. U.S. listed firms are obliged to disclose a 
simplified country-by-country reporting that consists of a list of their significant 
subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k to the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC).
38
 Interestingly, several companies removed a substantial number of 
foreign subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 between 2007 and 2012. For example, Oracle 
disclosed more than 400 significant subsidiaries for the fiscal year 2010, whereas in 
2011, this number declined to six significant subsidiaries, of which only two are based in 
foreign countries.
39
 As their 10-k filings mention an extensive expansion and acquisition 
program and do not reveal any reasons for this extensive reduction, there is no obvious 
reason for this despite the broad interpretation of the SEC regulation.
40
 For the cases of 
                                                          
37
 Cf. http://fortune.com/2015/05/26/amazon-is-going-to-pay-more-tax-in-europe/. 
38
 The disclosure rule Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601) requires the disclosure of all 
significant subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 to Form 10-k. 
39
 Cf. The Incredible Vanishing Subsidiary – From Google to FedEx, Wall Street Journal, 5/22/2013; 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323463704578497290099032374. Note that U.S. 
subsidiaries are also included here, whereas our following analysis considers only foreign subsidiaries [cf. 
Section 4.3.1]. 
40
 Cf. https://www.sec.gov/cgibin/browseedgar?CIK=1341439&Find=Search&owner=exclude&action= 
getcompany. 
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Google and Oracle, Gramlich and Whiteaker-Poe (2013) searched public company 
registers after they significantly reduced their number of subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 
21. Their investigation detects that in these cases, at least 65 % of the disappearing 
subsidiaries still existed in 2012.  
In addition to this change in disclosure policy, their ETR measures suggest that 
this change in disclosure policy is followed by a change in tax avoidance behavior. For 
example, Oracle reported a Foreign ETR of 22 % in 2007. In 2012, they reported a 
Foreign ETR of 15 %. We use the phenomenon of diminishing foreign subsidiaries in 
our empirical analysis to test whether international tax avoidance is affected. We 
combine information disclosed in Exhibit 21 with financial information for 2007 and 
2012. These years can be considered the beginning and end of the period of significant 
changes in reporting of foreign subsidiaries. During this period, more than 30 firms that 
are required to file Exhibit 21 significantly reduced the number of foreign subsidiaries 
disclosed in Exhibit 21. We contacted each of these firms in order to evaluate their 
reasons for this change in disclosure behavior. Most of the firms refer to M&A activities 
as the main reason for their changes in disclosure. None of the firms that answered 
specified tax planning as reason of specific interest.  
We analyze whether these diminishing firms became more tax aggressive after 
changing their public disclosure attitude compared to firms that did not change their 
public disclosure. As most of the firms referred to M&A activities as the main reason for 
their change in disclosure, we do control for M&A activities in our analysis. As ETRs 
are well accepted measures for tax avoidance, we consider Foreign ETR, Foreign 
Current ETR and GAAP ETR in our analysis. In addition, we also take the new measure 
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ETRDIFF (Herbert and Overesch, 2015) into consideration which identifies the 
aggressive part of international tax avoidance. 
The empirical results suggest that firms that decided to substantially reduce the 
number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in their Exhibit 21 avoid significantly more 
taxes compared to firms that did not change disclosure. The effect of public disclosure 
on international tax avoidance is robust across different specifications and different 
measures of international tax avoidance. Moreover, our results confirm that international 
tax avoidance of U.S. multinational firms is determined by tax haven operations and 
profit-shifting opportunities.   
Our results contribute to the recent debate on base erosion and profit-shifting. In 
particular, our results suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country information 
might influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss the 
impact of public disclosure on international tax avoidance. Section 4.3 describes our 
research design. Empirical results are presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2.   Prior Literature and Research Question  
4.2.1. Determinants of International Tax Avoidance 
Several U.S. based MNEs have recently been at the center of public discussion due 
to their aggressive tax planning activities. The public discussion has focused primarily 
on strategies affecting foreign tax payments. For example, the coffeehouse chain 
Starbucks paid only £8.6 million in U.K. corporate taxes on sales of £3 billion from 
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1998 to 2012.
41
 Nevertheless, Starbucks’ top-level functionaries stressed that the 
company’s tax rate was 32 % on U.S. profits.42 This case suggests that U.S. MNEs reach 
their low ETRs through foreign activities. 
MNEs benefit from additional tax planning opportunities as profits can be shifted 
to subsidiaries subject to low tax rates. Previous studies have found that reported profits 
of multinational subsidiaries are inversely related to the local tax level, suggesting intra-
firm shifting of taxable profits (cf. Hines and Rice, 1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; 
Blouin, Robinson and Seidman, 2015; Klassen and LaPlante, 2012a, 2012b).  
A broad literature has already analyzed different tax planning strategies used by 
MNEs to reduce the overall foreign tax bill. MNEs exploit international tax rate 
differentials by means of transfer pricing for intra-firm sales (Clausing, 2003) and 
allocation of valuable patents to low-tax subsidiaries to facilitate profit-shifting by 
charging intra-firm royalties (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Griffith, Miller and 
O’Connell, 2014). Moreover, MNEs establish subsidiaries in tax haven countries (Desai, 
Foley and Hines, 2006)
43
 and benefit from different definitions of residence. In 
particular, structures including subsidiaries in Ireland benefit from the different 
definitions of residence under U.S. and Irish tax law (Ting, 2014).  
Referring to these prior empirical findings, we revisit potential determinants of 
international tax avoidance in our analysis. In particular, we analyze how certain 
strategies of international tax avoidance affect the ETRs of multinational firms. Our 
                                                          
41
 Cf. Starbucks suffers first U.K. sales after tax row, The Independent, 24/04/2014; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/starbucks-suffers-first-uk-sales-fall-after-tax-row-
9284988.html. 
42
 Cf. Starbucks Asks Congress For Expanded Tax Breaks, The Huffington Post,  
24/04/2013; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/24/starbucks-tax-breaks_n_3150050.html. 
43
 Subpart F of the IRC should prevent U.S. based firms from using subsidiaries in tax havens. However, 
U.S. firms can opt to disregard entities in their U.S. tax returns (‘check the box’) to avoid the 
consequences of Subpart F. 
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analysis is related to studies by Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford 
(2012a, 2012b) that consider tax haven operations and proxies for profit-shifting 
channels as determinants of ETR measures.  
4.2.2. Influence of Public Disclosure on International Tax Avoidance 
Although it is well-known that MNEs engage in all types of tax avoidance (for an 
overview cf. Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010) and that the empirical evidence shows that 
some firms use tax planning strategies while others do not (Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew, 2008), it is still not well understood what differentiates these firms from other 
firms that do not engage in tax planning or even tax sheltering.  
One potential explanation is that the extent to which a firm engages in 
international tax avoidance is associated with costs. The prior literature shows that lower 
ETRs result in significantly higher tax uncertainty (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2014). 
Therefore, engagement in tax avoiding strategies or tax shelter schemes results not only 
in the benefit of paying less tax but also in the risk of being detected or suffering a bad 
reputation for the firm and its top management. In this case, tax avoidance is limited by 
costs of tax planning and incentivizing managers as well as by substitution effects due to 
limited management capacity (Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian and Sandner, 2014). Therefore, a 
firm should only engage in tax avoidance if benefits outweigh costs.  
The prior literature finds ambiguous evidence for this relationship. While some 
studies assert that some firms do not engage in tax avoidance due to the costs involved, 
other studies do not confirm this relationship (for an overview cf. Gallemore, Maydew 
and Thornock, 2014; Jacob, Rohlfing-Bastian and Sandner, 2014).  
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Most of these studies do not take into consideration the fact that costs depend on 
information available for assessment of a firm’s tax strategy by tax authorities, 
customers or the general public. Access to proprietary information is often a requirement 
for a tax audit of complex international tax avoidance strategies such as holding 
structures or transfer pricing schemes. While the information requests of fiscal 
authorities might be satisfied by reporting requirements that are exclusively submitted to 
the tax authorities, a rating of the scope of tax avoidance by customers or the general 
public requires publicly available information. In particular, tax strategies have an 
impact on the firm structure of U.S. MNEs (Lewellen and Robinson, 2013) and tax 
shelter is positively related to the use of tax haven subsidiaries (Lisowsky, 2010). 
Therefore, information about subsidiaries located in tax haven countries is often 
perceived as evidence for an aggressive tax avoidance strategy. If this information is 
publicly available, firms might engage less in tax haven subsidiaries due to public 
pressure they anticipate.  
A recent survey among tax executives of U.S. firms confirms the concern of 
reputational costs associated with corporate tax planning (Graham et al., 2014). 
Therefore, managers should be less tax aggressive if they perceive significant 
reputational costs associated with public disclosure regulations revealing their tax 
avoidance strategies.  
Nevertheless, managers might be able to reduce transparency concerning their 
international firm structure or tax planning strategies. In this case, customers cannot 
observe the details of the tax strategy used and reputational costs are avoided.  
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Non-tax literature finds evidence that poor transparency is often associated with 
cost for firms. For example, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) show that the cost of capital 
decreases if the level of disclosure increases. Biddle and Hilary (2006) show that an 
increase in accounting quality involves an increase in investment efficiency. If a firm 
uses tax planning strategies, these results may not be confirmed, as this firm benefits 
from less transparency due to the decreasing risk of being detected or suffering bad 
reputation.  
Empirical evidence of the effect that accounting transparency has on tax 
aggressiveness is scarce in the tax literature. Hope, Ma and Thomas (2013) analyze the 
adoption of the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 in 1998 that 
allows firms to abstain from disclosure of geographic earnings in their financial reports. 
They find that opting to discontinue geographic earnings disclosure was associated with 
significantly lower ETRs. However, their results suggest that the effects vanished in 
2004 when U.S. firms were required to include Schedule M-3 – a type of country-by-
country reporting – in their tax returns. Recently, Dyreng, Hoopes and Wilde (2014) 
analyzed public pressure on MNEs in the United Kingdom to carefully report a complete 
list of all foreign subsidiaries. They find increasing ETRs for U.K. firms after they had 
to reveal their list of foreign subsidiaries.  
We consider Exhibit 21as a simplified country-by-country reporting. Exhibit 21 is 
part of Form 10-k, which U.S. listed firms are obliged to submit to the SEC for each 
fiscal year. According to the disclosure rule 601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601), 
they must provide a list of all significant subsidiaries and their countries of 
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incorporation. Accordingly, the disclosed information allows a rough understanding of a 
firm’s international group structure.  
Interestingly, it can be observed that some firms have removed a substantial 
number of foreign subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 between 2007 and 2012. As 
mentioned above, there is no obvious reason for the decrease in subsidiaries despite a 
broad interpretation of the disclosure rule and the respective firm’s decision to opt for a 
lower level of transparency concerning their international activities.
44 
 As executives are 
partially responsible for a firm’s tax avoidance level (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 
2010), we expect executives of diminishing firms to deliberately make the decision to 
become more tax aggressive. Therefore, we use the fact that some firms significantly 
diminished the number of foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 and derive our research 
question that a diminishing of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k 
is associated with additional international tax avoidance. 
4.3.   Empirical Design 
4.3.1. Diminishing Subsidiaries in Firms’ Exhibit 21 
Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k reveals information about a firm’s subsidiaries and their 
countries of incorporation. Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601) requires, 
however, only the disclosure of significant subsidiaries. A subsidiary is deemed to be 
insignificant if three materiality conditions are fulfilled. Even though the disclosure rule 
was not changed during this period, starting in 2008, a substantial number of subsidiaries 
                                                          
44
 While the SEC’s definition can give some room for interpretation and the disclosure might be difficult 
to enforce by the SEC, the potential penalty for failure to file information is only $100 per day (15 U.S.C. 
§78ff), or $36,500 per year. 
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vanished from some Exhibit 21 disclosures.
45
 Therefore, we assume that the 
phenomenon of diminishing subsidiaries derives from a different interpretation of Item 
601 of SEC Regulation S-K (§229.601). Considering Exhibit 21 disclosures of various 
firms in a time period between 2007 and 2012, we conclude that most firms completed 
their diminishing process by the end of the fiscal year 2012. Therefore, we compare 
Exhibit 21 data of fiscal years 2007 and 2012 to identify firms that have significantly 
diminished their list of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21.  
We assume a substantial decline in significant subsidiaries if the number of 
foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 declined by more than 50 % between 2007 and 2012. 
We do not consider the U.S. subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21, as we only analyze the 
influence of public disclosure on international tax avoidance. Moreover, we consider a 
firm only as diminishing if at least 10 significant foreign subsidiaries vanished from 
Exhibit 21.  
To further investigate disclosure behavior, we contacted the investor relations 
departments of our diminishing firms. We asked them via letters and email about the 
reasons for their decreasing number of subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21.
46
 Only four 
firms responded to our request. We interpret this fact as an indication of their rather 
reluctant behavior concerning the supply of publicly available company information. For 
those firms that responded to our request, tax planning was not of particular importance. 
The firms refer to M&A activities as the main reason for their changes in disclosure. If 
                                                          
45
 According to SEC Regulation (17 CFR 210.1-02(w)), (1) the parent company’s and its other 
subsidiaries’ investments in the subsidiary do not exceed 10 % of the parent company’s total assets; (2) 
the parent company’s and its other subsidiaries’ proportionate share of the assets of the subsidiary do not 
exceed 10 % of the consolidated firm’s total assets; and (3) the parent company’s and its other 
subsidiaries’ investments proportionate share of the subsidiary’s pre-tax income from continuing 
operations does not exceed 10 % of the consolidated income from continuing operations. 
46
 The complete request can be found in Appendix 2. 
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we attempt to verify this explanation, we are unable to retrace all of the vanishing 
foreign subsidiaries as being related to the respective restructuring process. Because 
restructuring is partly a reason in some cases, we account for changes in Exhibit 21 due 
to M&A activities. We assume that a firm’s sales should significantly decline if it sells 
parts of its business and therefore reports fewer subsidiaries in Exhibit 21. Therefore, we 
reclassify diminishing as non-diminishing if the firm belongs to the top 5 % decreasing 
total sales. 
Imposing this definition on our research sample identifies 31 firms that 
significantly diminished their public disclosure of foreign subsidiaries. DIMINISHING is 
defined as a dummy variable being 1 for these 31 firms. We expect DIMINISHING to 
have a positive effect on international tax aggressiveness in the aftermath of changing 
the public disclosure about foreign subsidiaries. 
Table 1 provides an overview of these firms and their share of diminishing 
subsidiaries, which is the percentage change between the number of foreign subsidiaries 
in 2007 and 2012.  
Figure 1 depicts the mean values of Foreign ETRs for diminishing 
(DIMINISHING = 1) and non-diminishing (DIMINISHING = 0) firms in 2007 and 2012. 
The mean Foreign ETR for the diminishing companies decreases from 0.34 in 2007 to 
0.22 in 2012, which constitutes a decrease by 35 %, whereas it remains almost 
unchanged for the non-diminishing firms. In 2012, the Foreign ETR mean of the 
diminishing firms is 0.22 compared to 0.26 of the non-diminishing companies. These 
descriptive statistics confirm our expectation that firms that substantially reduced public 
disclosure of foreign subsidiaries in their Exhibit 21 avoided additional taxes in 2012. In 
  
111 
 
Section 4.4, we will use regression analysis to further identify the impact of public 
disclosure on the scope of international tax avoidance. 
TABLE 1: Overview Diminishing Firms 
  Company Name 
Share of Diminishing Foreign 
Subsidiaries  
1 HILLSHIRE BRANDS CO 0.9887 
2 FEDEX CORP 0.9792  
3 ORACLE CORP 0.9759  
4 ALTRIA GROUP INC 0.9752 
5 GOOGLE INC 0.9683 
6 URS CORP  0.9624 
7 TRIMAS CORP 0.9583 
8 BOEING CO 0.9151 
9 ALLY FINANCIAL INC 0.9091 
10 MRV COMMUNICATIONS INC  0.8667  
11 FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC  0.8571  
12 AEP INDUSTRIES INC 0.8462 
13 CARDINAL HEALTH INC 0.7669  
14 WEBSENSE INC 0.7667 
15 NYSE EURONEXT  0.7632  
16 ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC 0.7368 
17 CALPINE CORP 0.7000 
18 ITT CORP 0.6964  
19 CYPRESS SEMICONDUCTOR CORP 0.6774 
20 FEDERAL SIGNAL CORP 0.6538  
21 DANAHER CORP 0.6381 
22 ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES 0.6190 
23 ACI WORLDWIDE INC 0.6170 
24 YRC WORLDWIDE INC 0.6047 
25 INVESTMENT TECHNOLOGY GP INC  0.5909 
26 IAC/INTERACTIVECORP 0.5688 
27 DANA HOLDING CORP 0.5679 
28 CONOCOPHILLIPS 0.5372 
29 HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES 0.5333 
30 CONVERGYS CORP 0.5167  
31 E TRADE FINANCIAL CORP 0.5000 
Notes: Table 1 shows the diminishing firms (DIMINISHING = 1) of our main analysis and the percentage decrease                                       
of foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21. DIMINISHING is defined in the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 1: Foreign ETR – Mean Values 
 
Notes: Figure 1 shows the mean values for the dependent variable Foreign ETR in 2007 and                          
2012 for diminishing (DIMINISHING = 1) and non-diminishing firms (DIMINISHING = 0)                            
and the percentage change. DIMINISHING is defined in the Appendix. 
 
4.3.2. Research Design 
We test the effect of diminishing subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 on tax 
aggressiveness by a standard difference-in-differences approach (Meyer, 1995). We 
estimate the following Equation (1) to analyze the determinants of (international) tax 
avoidance of firm i in year t.  
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖  + 𝛽2(𝐷𝐼𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑆𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖 × 𝐷2012𝑡)      
                                   + 𝛽3𝐷2012𝑡  +  𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛿 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                      (1) 
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In our main analysis, we use a firm’s Foreign ETR as a Tax Measure, which is the 
quotient between the sum of foreign current taxes plus foreign deferred income taxes 
and foreign pre-tax income.
47
 ETRs are well-accepted proxies for tax avoidance, as a 
lower ETR suggests that a firm is more effectively avoiding income taxes compared to 
firms with higher ETRs. In further robustness checks, we also consider the                              
Foreign Current ETR and GAAP ETR as dependent variables.  
As described in Section 4.3.1, DIMINISHING is an indicator variable for firms 
that have significantly reduced their number of foreign subsidiaries reported in Exhibit 
21. D2012 is an indicator variable for the year 2012, i.e., the period after the 
diminishing. Therefore, 𝛽1 captures potential differences in tax avoidance between 
diminishing and non-diminishing firms. 𝛽3 controls for a general time trend in tax 
avoidance between 2007 and 2012.  
The variable of interest is the interaction term between DIMINISHING and D2012. 
The coefficient 𝛽2 captures a difference in the change of Tax Measure for diminishing 
firms between 2007 and 2012 compared to the general time trend in tax avoidance for 
non-diminishing firms. In accordance with our research question, we expect a negative 
significant effect for 𝛽2, indicating an increase in international tax avoidance of firms 
that have sharply reduced public disclosure of foreign subsidiaries.  
4.3.3. Control Variables 
Vector X of Equation (1) controls for several determinants of international tax 
avoidance. Financial statement information is mainly taken from Compustat. A list of all 
variable definitions can be found in Appendix 1.  
                                                          
47
 To limit the influence of outliers, we delete ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1. 
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In vector X, we consider two different groups of explanatory variables. The first 
group consists of tax avoidance determinants in terms of more general firm 
characteristics that have been used in the previous literature, whereas the second group 
includes particular variables that reflect certain international tax planning strategies. 
We consider SIZE, which is the natural logarithm of groups’ total assets as a 
control for the impact of general tax planning determinants. Considering the influence of 
SIZE on the ETR, prior research has found inconsistent results. Some studies reveal a 
positive correlation between size and ETR (Wang, 1991; Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003), 
while other studies find the opposite (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, we have no clear 
prediction concerning international tax avoidance. 
PROFITABILITY is measured as pre-tax income divided by total assets. Most 
studies find a negative correlation between tax avoidance and profitability (Gupta and 
Newberry, 1997; Plesko, 2003; Chen et al., 2010). However, some papers detect the 
opposite (Rego, 2003). Profitability and tax avoidance may be positively correlated, as 
more profitable firms have more opportunities and incentives to reduce tax expenses by 
engaging in tax avoidance.  
The variable capital intensity (CAPINT) is the quotient between property, plant 
and equipment and total assets. The association between ETR and CAPINT is also 
ambiguous. The most widely obtained result is a negative correlation with tax avoidance 
(Gupta and Newberry, 1997), which leads to the assumption that a high level of 
property, plant and equipment causes a tax reduction in ETR due to the deductibility of 
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high depreciations.
48
 Regarding international tax planning strategies, higher capital 
intensity might also indicate less mobility of taxable income.  
The variable LEV is defined as liabilities divided by total assets. Firms with a high 
level of debt can use the deductibility of interest expenses to reduce tax burden. 
However, the effect of leverage on the effective tax rate measures is ambiguous because 
interest payments do not only reduce taxable profits, and thus, tax expenditures, but also 
pre-tax earnings (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). While some previous studies have found 
an inverse relation with the ETR (Plesko, 2003; Markle and Shackelford, 2012b), others 
found the opposite (Chen et al., 2010). Therefore, we have no clear prediction. 
Utilization of prior operating tax loss carryforwards should reduce current period 
tax payments. NOL is a dummy variable that equals one if there has been a decrease in 
tax loss carry forwards and zero otherwise.
49
 Prior studies have predicted that firms 
utilizing NOLs should have lower ETRs (Mackie, 1999; Cooper and Knittel, 2010).  
The second group of variables considered in the vector X includes determinants of 
international tax avoidance. In line with previous evidence from subsidiary level data, 
we focus on tax planning via the use of tax havens and profit-shifting opportunities 
depending on the characteristics of a firm’s business. 
Profit-shifting opportunities vary across firms and industries. Previous studies 
have confirmed that the mobility of income increases if a firm has many intangible 
assets or high expenses for R&D or advertising (Harris, 1993; Grubert, 2003). We 
include the variable R&D, which is defined as R&D expenses scaled by total assets in 
                                                          
48
 Note that pre-tax profit, which is the denominator of the ETR, is also affected by depreciation and 
amortization. Therefore, not all studies have reached the same conclusion (Plesko, 2003). 
49
 Note that we have replaced missing values for tlcf in Compustat with the value zero, expecting these 
firms not to have any tax loss carryforwards in the respective period. 
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our analysis. A strong positive association with the scope of international tax avoidance 
is expected.
 50
  
HAVEN captures the number of tax haven countries in which a firm has 
subsidiaries scaled by the total number of countries in which the company operates 
according to the information disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k in 2007 and 2012. 
The definition of tax haven countries follows Dyreng and Lindsey (2009).   
In particular, firms in high-tech and pharmaceutical industries (“income mobile 
industries”) are best positioned to implement long-term tax avoidance strategies, as they 
possess significant intellectual property and products with global demand, which allow 
them to shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions via transfer pricing. According to De 
Simone, Mills and Stomberg (2014), we use three-digit SIC codes to compute the 
dummy variable INCOME MOBILE, which equals one if the industry membership of the 
parent is supposed to be income mobile.
51
 
Tax avoidance opportunities differ across industries due to the different business 
models (Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay, 2012). We therefore consider industry-fixed 
effects in accordance with the Fama and French classification of 17 different industry 
groups.
52
 
 
 
                                                          
50
 We require companies to have non-missing values for all components of the dependent and independent 
variables. However, visual inspection of several Form 10-k filings reveals that many of the missing values, 
especially for R&D expenses, in Compustat should be coded as zero. Therefore, we set missing values of 
the variable R&D to zero. 
51
 We classify the following three-digit SIC codes as income mobile industries: 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 
367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services). 
52
 Updated industry-classification can be downloaded from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/changes_ind.html. 
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4.3.4. Sample Selection 
We derive our data from two data sets: financial statement information from 
Compustat
53
 and subsidiary information disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k available 
at the SEC’s database EDGAR.54 For both data sets, we use data of the fiscal years 2007 
and 2012. Moreover, we require a non-missing CIK number, as these two data sets can 
only be combined by CIK. 
 Our starting point for data sampling is the financial statement data we derive from 
Compustat. Financial statement information is used to compute the tax avoidance 
measures and most of the explanatory variables described in Section 4.3.3. As we 
analyze the behavior of U.S. MNEs, we limit our sample to firms disclosing their 
financial statements in U.S. dollars and having their headquarters located in the U.S. Our 
analysis focuses on Foreign ETR as a tax measure. Hence, we require non-missing 
values for foreign pre-tax income and foreign current income taxes. As it is difficult to 
analyze our results concerning the tax planning activities of unprofitable companies in 
the respective period, we restrict the sample to firms having a positive pre-tax foreign 
income.
55
 Imposing these requirements, we remain with 2,967 observations. 
In a next step, we add the Exhibit 21 data set.
56
 We have collected company 
structures from Exhibit 21 for all of these 2,967 firms for the fiscal years 2007 and 
                                                          
53
 Further data used only for some variables are described in Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 
54
 https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
55
 In additional analysis, we use the GAAP ETR as tax avoidance measure. In these cases, we also require a 
positive pre-tax income. 
56
 We thank Scott D. Dyreng for offering his Exhibit 21 data set for download on 
https://spreadsheets.google.com/viewform?formkey=dElURjI1eUJvWDhHSmMwMmFPVmdvVnc6MQ. 
Further description of the data set can be found in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009). However, all data used in 
this paper were collected by us, as Dyreng’s data set only includes fiscal years until 2009 and we could not 
guarantee the comparability of his data to our data, which is essential for the variable DIMINISHIING. 
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2012.
57
 As a non-missing Exhibit 21 for the fiscal years 2007 and 2012 is required to 
construct the variable DIMINISHING, only those companies having an Exhibit 21 for 
both years are included in our analysis. In addition to being U.S. based, we require the 
firms to be multinational. A firm is defined as multinational if it conducts business in at 
least two countries besides the U.S. in accordance with their Exhibit 21 for the fiscal 
year 2007. Imposing these prerequisites on the data set creates a sample of 1,552 
observations from 2007 and 2012. 
The pooled data are used for regression analysis in Section 4.4. As we delete           
ETRs < 0 and ETRs > 1 to limit the influence of outliers and due to missing values in 
the control variables, we derive 1,309 observations for our analysis. Table 2 provides 
summary statistics of all variables used. 
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Foreign ETR 1,309 0.2633 0.1597 0.0008 0.9946 
SIZE (ln) 1,309 7.7331 1.7213 2.9432 13.9287 
PROFITABILITY 1,309 0.0877 0.0956 -0.4978 0.6513 
CAPINT 1,309  0.4240 0.3213 0 1.6646 
LEV 1,309 0.0316 0.0586 0 0.4554 
NOL 1,309 0.2811 0.4497 0 1 
HAVEN 1,309 0.2122 0.1531 0 1 
INCOME MOBILE 1,309 0.2552 0.4361 0 1 
R&D 1,309 0.0363 0.0567 0 0.6999 
DIMINISHING 1,309 0.0382 0.1917 0 1 
Notes: Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for all variables included in our main regression analysis. Variables are 
defined in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
                                                          
57
 Starting with an automatically created data set, we also manually checked the collected data. As the 
country Georgia cannot be distinguished from the U.S. state Georgia in our data set, we deleted Georgia 
from our sample.  
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4.4. Empirical Results 
In our empirical analysis, we test our research question derived in Section 4.2 and 
investigate the influence of diminishing subsidiaries from publicly disclosed financial 
filings in addition to other well-known determinants of tax planning channels on MNEs’ 
international tax avoidance. We expect diminishing firms to avoid more taxes and 
become more tax aggressive than non-diminishing firms. We test this relation in 
regression analysis in accordance with the approach described in Section 4.3.2 and based 
on pooled data from the fiscal years 2007 and 2012. 
4.4.1. Main Findings 
Table 3 presents OLS regression results for the Foreign ETR as dependent 
variable. Specifications (1) and (2) show the plain diminishing effect with and without 
industry-fixed effects. In column (3), we add variables concerning firm characteristics 
and general tax planning activities. In column (4), we consider additional variables for 
international tax planning activities. Specifications (5) and (6) repeat the analysis 
without DIMINISHING and the interaction term. Starting with column (2), all 
specifications are augmented with industry fixed effects.   
In specifications (1) – (4), we test whether the diminishing coverage of foreign 
subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 of Form 10-k is associated with more aggressive tax 
avoidance. The specifications contain the dummy variable DIMINISHING and an 
interaction term between the indicator variable for diminishing firms and the time 
dummy for 2012 (DIMINISHING x D2012). In columns (3) and (4), we additionally 
include variables for general and international tax planning activities, whereas columns 
(1) and (2) show the diminishing effect without any control variables. The coefficient for 
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the interaction is always negative and statistically significant in all four difference-in-
differences estimations that include DIMINISHING. This result suggests that the 
Foreign ETR of the diminishing firms declined significantly after diminishing the 
number of publicly disclosed foreign subsidiaries. The point estimates for the interaction 
DIMINISHING x D2012 are of a magnitude of approximately 0.11. Considering the 
sample mean Foreign ETR of approximately 0.263, this magnitude is remarkable.   
With the exception of column (1), we find no statistically significant difference 
between diminishing and non-diminishing firms in 2007. The plain time indicator 
D2012 is not significant at the conventional level throughout all specifications. Thus, we 
cannot confirm a general downward trend in the Foreign ETR between 2007 and 2012.  
In the following, the results for the control variables in specifications (3) – (6) are 
briefly discussed. Columns (5) and (6) do not include the DIMINISHING variable and 
the interaction term in order to confirm the robustness of the results. Across 
specifications (3) – (6), PROFITABILITY exerts a strong negative effect on the Foreign 
ETR. This finding is very reasonable. Because a cross-border offsetting of subsidiary 
losses and profits is hardly ever allowed, it is very likely that firms with lower 
profitability pay taxes on gross profits in some countries while suffering from loss 
carryforwards in other locations. Simultaneously, the denominator of the Foreign ETR 
might be small because pre-tax foreign income is balanced across all foreign 
subsidiaries. Moreover, widely used transfer pricing methods such as the cost plus 
method, the resale pricing method or the transactional net margin method are associated 
with particular profit-shifting opportunities if profitability is abnormally high.       
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In addition, all specifications depict a strong negative association between SIZE 
and Foreign ETR, indicating that larger firms are more engaged in tax planning 
activities. The variable NOL is negative and significant at the conventional level as well, 
which confirms that the use of prior operating tax loss carryforwards reduces firms’ tax 
payments. 
With the exception of specification (4), LEV has a positive and significant 
influence on the Foreign ETR. This finding shows that the foreign pre-tax profits are 
more reduced by the deductibility of the interest payments than the tax expenses. 
 The variable CAPINT exerts a positive and significant influence on Foreign ETR 
if we do not control for international tax planning activities. The positive effect suggests 
less aggressive tax avoidance if the firm employs more property, plant and equipment. 
This result is in line with the expectations that profit-shifting is predominantly 
associated with intangibles and intra-firm sales. 
In specifications (4) and (6) of Table 3, we add variables for international tax 
planning activities. We include the variables INCOME MOBILE and R&D to investigate 
the influence of profit-shifting opportunities and to analyze whether the Foreign ETR is 
smaller if income is supposed to be highly mobile. Indeed, we find a negative and 
significant effect for the dummy variable INCOME MOBILE with a coefficient of 
approximately 0.03. We can also confirm a strong negative and significant influence of 
the variable R&D. Taking into consideration the coefficient of 0.28, we receive an 
additional effect of approximately 1.6 percentage points on the Foreign ETR for a firm 
with an R&D intensity that is one standard deviation higher. By adding the variable 
HAVEN, our analysis refers to the ongoing debate on aggressive tax planning via tax 
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havens. Our results support the expectation that Foreign ETR is smaller if a firm has 
more subsidiaries in tax haven countries. Evaluated at sample means, tax havens are 
responsible for a decrease in Foreign ETR of almost 2 percentage points.  
TABLE 3: Foreign ETR 
Foreign ETR 1 2 3 4 5 6 
DIMINISHING x 2012 -0.1130*** -0.1150*** -0.1100*** -0.1040** 
    (0.0399) (0.0401) (0.0394) (0.0405) 
  DIMINISHING 0.0742* 0.0650 0.0680 0.0692 
    (0.0428) (0.0424) (0.0420) (0.0423) 
  D2012 -0.0053 -0.0048 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0073 -0.0074 
  (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0077) 
SIZE 
  
-0.0090*** -0.0090*** -0.0086*** -0.0088*** 
  
  
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
PROFITABILITY 
  
-0.1590*** -0.2020*** -0.1600*** -0.2040*** 
  
  
(0.0543) (0.0560) (0.0544) (0.0560) 
CAPINT 
  
0.0358** 0.0236 0.0350** 0.0228 
  
  
(0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0174) (0.0169) 
LEV 
  
0.1650** 0.1150 0.1760** 0.1260* 
  
  
(0.0745) (0.0725) (0.0739) (0.0719) 
NOL 
  
-0.0153* -0.0151* -0.0157* -0.0154* 
  
  
(0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0088) 
HAVEN 
   
-0.0894*** 
 
-0.0912*** 
  
   
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0344) 
INCOME MOBILE 
   
-0.0328** 
 
-0.0323** 
  
   
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0135) 
R&D 
   
-0.2800*** 
 
-0.2830*** 
  
   
(0.1050) 
 
(0.1050) 
CONSTANT 0.2660*** 0.2660*** 0.3300*** 0.3800*** 0.3310*** 0.3820*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0267) (0.0271) 
Hausman test 0.47 0.65 0.34 0.46     
[p - value] [0.6280] [0.5226] [0.7141] [0.6325]     
Industry-FE 
      
N 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 
R² 0.006 0.041 0.068 0.096 0.064 0.092 
 Notes: Table 3 presents the results of our main OLS regressions with the Foreign ETR as dependent variable. Numbers in  
 parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by firms. Numbers in brackets for the Hausman test are p-values. Variables 
 are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
 
One restriction to our results is the potential endogeneity of the variable 
DIMINISHING. While we expect DIMINISHING to influence a firm’s international tax 
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avoidance, some firms might diminish the number of subsidiaries disclosed in their 
Exhibit 21 because they are already tax aggressive. As none of the diminishing firms we 
contacted cited tax planning as reason of particular interest, we do not expect to have the 
problem of endogeneity. Specifications (5) and (6) of Table 3 show that the effects of 
our control variables hold if we do not consider the variables DIMINISHING and 
DIMINISHING x D2012. This robustness of our results is another indicator that the 
potential endogeneity is not of further interest. To corroborate this idea, we use the 
regression-based form of the Hausman test for endogeneity (Hausman 1978, 1983). 
The Hausman test for endogeneity requires an instrument variable that is 
uncorrelated with our dependent variable – in our case the Foreign ETR as measures of 
tax avoidance – and correlated with the endogenous variable – in our case 
DIMINISHING and DIMINISHING x D2012 – conditional on the explanatory variables 
of the outcome regression. As an instrument, we use the percentage change in the word 
count of Form 10-k between 2007 and 2012. Changes in the length of Form 10-k are a 
good proxy for the general preference for the disclosure of proprietary information, 
which also significantly affects the disclosure of foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21. 
However, the general preference for disclosure quality is not directly correlated with tax 
avoidance.  
We regress DIMINISHING and DIMINISHING x D2012 on all variables, 
including our instrument for change in the word count of 10-k and the interaction term 
of this instrument variable and D2012. In a second stage, we include the residuals from 
these regressions in Equation (1) and perform a joint F-test. In columns (1) – (4) of 
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Table 3, we report the results for the joint F-tests that clearly reject the endogeneity of 
DIMINISHING and DIMINISHING x D2012. 
4.4.2. Alternative Measures for Diminishing 
In additional analysis, we focus on two different measures for DIMINISHING in 
order to show the robustness of our main results in Table 3. We keep the Foreign ETR as 
the dependent variable and test two alternative diminishing definitions in two 
specifications. Table 4 depicts the respective regression results.  
In specifications (1) and (2), we consider change in total assets as a proxy for 
firms’ M&A activities and reclassify diminishing firms that belong to the top 5 % 
diminishing firms in decreasing total assets as non-diminishing. The other prerequisites 
remain unchanged compared to our main definition of DIMINISHING. The number of 
foreign subsidiaries has to decline by more than 50 % between 2007 and 2012, and at 
least 10 significant foreign subsidiaries have to vanish from Exhibit 21. Imposing this 
definition on our sample identifies 32 firms that significantly diminished their public 
disclosure of foreign subsidiaries. The coefficient for the interaction term 
DIMINISHING x D2012 is again negative and significant in both specifications. 
Moreover, we find a statistically significant difference between diminishing and non-
diminishing firms in 2007. This confirms our descriptive findings that firms avoid 
additional taxes in 2012 if they disclose fewer foreign subsidiaries in their Exhibit 21 
(Figure 1). Again, the plain time dummy D2012 is not significant at the conventional 
level. 
In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 4, we define DIMINISHING as one if the 
number of subsidiaries declined between 2007 and 2012, but sales increased by more 
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than 50 % during this time period. We identify 54 firms as diminishing. The analysis 
confirms our results from Table 3. The point estimates for the interaction  
DIMINISHING x D2012 is lower (approximately 0.07) but still negative and significant 
in both specifications. DIMINISHING and the time dummy D2012 are both not 
significant at the conventional level. Thus, with each DIMINISHING definition, the 
difference-in-differences estimations suggest a significant rise in tax avoidance as a 
response to less public disclosure of foreign subsidiaries. In addition, our results for the 
influence of (international) tax planning strategies on the Foreign ETR remain robust. 
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TABLE 4: Alternative Measures for Diminishing 
Foreign ETR 1 2 3 4 
DIMINISHING x 2012 -0.0931** -0.0911** -0.0699** -0.0725** 
  (0.0405) (0.0411) (0.0350) (0.0355) 
DIMINISHING 0.0756* 0.0754* 0.0191 0.0336 
  (0.0394) (0.0400) (0.0371) (0.0363) 
D2012 -0.0037 -0.0038 -0.0030 -0.0032 
  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
SIZE -0.0091*** -0.0093*** -0.0086*** -0.0088*** 
  (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0032) 
PROFITABILITY -0.1560*** -0.1990*** -0.1600*** -0.2030*** 
  (0.0542) (0.0559) (0.0544) (0.0560) 
CAPINT 0.0357** 0.0235 0.0329* 0.0215 
  (0.0173) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0169) 
LEV 0.1740** 0.1230* 0.1710** 0.1200* 
  (0.0738) (0.0719) (0.0742) (0.0723) 
NOL -0.0156* -0.0153* -0.0147 -0.0149* 
  (0.0090) (0.0086) (0.0090) (0.0088) 
HAVEN 
 
-0.0898*** 
 
-0.0893** 
  
 
(0.0345) 
 
(0.0348) 
INCOME MOBILE 
 
-0.0326** 
 
-0.0326** 
  
 
(0.0135) 
 
(0.0133) 
R&D 
 
-0.2830*** 
 
-0.2820*** 
  
 
(0.1050) 
 
(0.1050) 
CONSTANT 0.3320*** 0.3820*** 0.3310*** 0.3800*** 
  (0.0271) (0.0275) (0.0263) (0.0266) 
Industry-FE     
N 1,309 1,309 1,309 1,309 
R² 0.068 0.096 0.067 0.095 
Notes: Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions with the Foreign ETR as dependent variable and different 
DIMINISHING definitions. Specifications (1) and (2) define DIMINISHING as one if the number of subsidiaries has 
declined by > 50 % between 2007 and 2012 and (i) ≥ 10 subsidiaries are diminished and (ii) firm does not belong to 
the top 5% firms in decreasing total assets (at). Specifications (3) and (4) define DIMINISING as one if (i) number of 
subsidiaries has declined between 2007 and 2012 and (ii) sales (sale) have increased by > 50 %. Robust standard 
errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show 
significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively.   
 
 
4.4.3. Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance 
The previous literature has employed different definitions of ETRs to measure tax 
avoidance (cf. for example Plesko 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). 
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Therefore, we also consider Foreign Current ETR and GAAP ETR according to                
ASC 740-20 as alternative measures of tax avoidance in additional analysis. We use the 
sample described in Section 4.3.4. The only difference is that we do not consider firms 
having a negative pre-tax income when we use the GAAP ETR as a dependent variable. 
The additional results are reported in Table 5. We consider the same control variables 
for general and international tax planning activities as in Table 4. All specifications are 
augmented with industry-fixed effects. 
First, we take into account the Foreign Current ETR, which includes only foreign 
current tax expenses in the numerator as dependent variable in order to avoid possible 
bias due to deferred taxes. 
Across both specifications, the interaction terms between DIMINISHING and 
D2012 for the post-diminishing period are highly significant and show the expected 
negative signs. Neither the dummy variable DIMINISHING nor the time indicator exerts 
any statistical effect at the conventional level. Regarding the influence of general firm 
characteristics and international tax planning activities, we observe similar results 
compared to the findings for the Foreign ETR in Table 3.  
In specifications (3) and (4) of Table 5, we present additional tests using the  
GAAP ETR which is the quotient between total taxes and pre-tax profit as dependent 
variable. According to ASC 740-20, we do not consider the influence of extraordinary 
items on the pre-tax profit and subtract them in the denominator. This measure does not 
exclusively consider foreign activities. Therefore, these additional tests answer the 
question whether the change in disclosure about foreign firm structures affects a firm’s 
overall tax avoidance behavior.  
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The results suggest that the diminishing of publicly disclosed foreign subsidiaries 
does not affect the GAAP ETR. The dummy variable DIMINISHING and the interaction 
term DIMINISHING x D2012 again have the expected sign but are no longer significant 
at the conventional level. However, we find a negative and significant impact of the 
plain time dummy D2012, which indicates a significant downward trend in the                
GAAP ETR. As the GAAP ETR is also influenced by a general time trend, the Foreign 
ETR can be regarded as more suitable for our analysis, which mainly considers foreign 
activities. Interestingly, except of SIZE, all general firm characteristics have no 
significant influence on the GAAP ETR, whereas the proxies for international tax 
planning activities exert significant effects. 
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TABLE 5: Alternative Measures of Tax Avoidance 
  Foreign Current ETR GAAP ETR 
  1 2 3 4 
DIMINISHING x 2012 -0.1090** -0.0995** -0.0388 -0.0393 
  (0.0442) (0.0445) (0.0302) (0.0330) 
DIMINISHING 0.0609 0.0618 0.0383 0.0391 
  (0.0390) (0.0385) (0.0313) (0.0316) 
D2012 0.0022 0.0021 -0.0143** -0.0150** 
  (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0061) (0.0060) 
SIZE -0.0071** -0.0065* -0.0042 -0.0028 
  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0026) 
PROFITABILITY -0.2040*** -0.2430*** 0.0527 0.0611 
  (0.0569) (0.0599) (0.0462) (0.0445) 
CAPINT 0.0291 0.0159 0.0004 -0.0138 
  (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0134) (0.0130) 
LEV 0.0607 0.0072 0.0331 -0.0313 
  (0.0795) (0.0784) (0.0697) (0.0696) 
NOL -0.0208** -0.0210** -0.0066 -0.0045 
  (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0074) (0.0070) 
HAVEN   -0.1340*** 
 
-0.1210*** 
    (0.0342) 
 
(0.0339) 
INCOME MOBILE   -0.0399*** 
 
-0.0216** 
    (0.0139) 
 
(0.0102) 
R&D   -0.2150* 
 
-0.4000*** 
    (0.1200) 
 
(0.0944) 
CONSTANT 0.3420*** 0.3940*** 0.3360*** 0.3720*** 
  (0.0281) (0.0285) (0.0244) (0.0242) 
Industry-FE     
N 1,285 1,285 1,104 1,104 
R² 0.059 0.092 0.083 0.139 
Notes: Table 5 presents results of OLS regressions with the Foreign Current ETR in columns (1) – (2) and the GAAP 
ETR in columns (3) – (4) as dependent variables. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, 
respectively. 
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4.4.4. ETRDIFF as Measure of Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
We also use the new measure ETRDIFF that isolates the additional or even aggressive 
part in international tax avoidance from well-known determinants of effective tax rates 
in order to evaluate the influence of public disclosure on tax planning behavior. 
The measure ETRDIFF considers the difference between a firm’s average of the 
statutory corporate tax rates imposed by its host countries taken from Exhibit 21 of Form 
10-k (STR) and its ETR.58 Since STR is used as a proxy for the expected tax level 
according to the distribution of real economic activities, we do not consider tax havens. 
Thus, we classify a firm as more tax aggressive if the gap between its ETR and its 
expected benchmark tax level increases (Herbert and Overesch, 2015).  
In accordance with Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.3, we use the Foreign ETRDIFF, 
Foreign Current ETRDIFF and GAAP ETRDIFF as corresponding ETRDIFF measures. 
Table 6 shows the regression results considering the same variables as in Tables 4 and 5. 
Please note that the expected signs for each effect reverse due to the construction of the 
ETRDIFF. 
Across all columns (1) – (6), we can confirm a significant effect of diminishing the 
list of foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 on the three respective ETRDIFF measures for 
aggressive international tax avoidance. The interaction terms between DIMINISHING 
and the time dummy D2012 for the post-diminishing period are always highly 
significant and show the expected positive signs. In contrast to the GAAP ETR, the 
GAAP ETRDIFF suggests that the diminishing coverage of foreign subsidiaries in 
Exhibit 21 is higher for tax aggressive firms.  
                                                          
58
 Due to the exclusion of tax havens, we lose a few observations for the Foreign ETRDIFF and Foreign 
Current ETRDIFF.  
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Interestingly, the plain time dummy is significant at 1 % level for all three 
ETRDIFF measures. Accordingly, we now identify a time effect, i.e., the general level 
of the Foreign ETRDIFF and Foreign Current ETRDIFF declined while the                   
Foreign ETR and Foreign Current ETR did not change between 2007 and 2012                     
(cf. Tables 3 and 5). In addition, we also find a weak significant difference between 
diminishing and non-diminishing firms in 2007 across all specifications. 
Regarding the influence of international tax planning activities, we receive robust 
results similar to the findings for the Foreign ETR, Foreign Current ETR and                    
GAAP ETR in Tables 3 and 5. 
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  TABLE 6: ETRDIFF as Measure of Aggressive International Tax Avoidance 
Notes: Table 6 presents results of OLS regressions with the Foreign ETRDIFF in columns (1) – (2), the Foreign 
Current ETRDIFF in columns (3) – (4) and the GAAP ETRDIFF in columns (5) – (6) as dependent variables. Robust 
standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix. *, ** and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 % and 1 %, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  Foreign ETRDIFF 
Foreign Current 
ETRDIFF 
GAAP ETRDIFF 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
DIMINISHING x 2012 0.1090*** 0.1120*** 0.1100** 0.1100** 0.0764*** 0.0769** 
  (0.0415) (0.0412) (0.0472) (0.0459) (0.0309) (0.0324) 
DIMINISHING -0.0699* -0.0718* -0.0635* -0.0651* -0.0399* -0.0412* 
  (0.0414) (0.0418) (0.0383) (0.0379) (0.0240) (0.0248) 
D2012 -0.0339*** -0.0342*** -0.0393*** -0.0398*** -0.0166*** -0.0159*** 
  (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0062) (0.0061) 
SIZE 0.0055* 0.0062* 0.0039 0.0038 -0.0011 -0.0010 
  (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0025) 
PROFITABILITY 0.1440*** 0.1890*** 0.1890*** 0.2310*** -0.0810* -0.0884** 
  (0.0545) (0.0564) (0.0574) (0.0603) (0.0465) (0.0440) 
CAPINT -0.0339** -0.0236 -0.0268 -0.0162 -0.0016 0.0142 
  (0.0172) (0.0166) (0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0137) (0.0132) 
LEV -0.1610** -0.1160 -0.0552 -0.0074 -0.0260 0.0455 
  (0.0741) (0.0713) (0.0798) (0.0779) (0.0650) (0.0636) 
NOL 0.0135 0.0145 0.0206** 0.0210** 0.0057 0.0036 
  (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0073) (0.0069) 
HAVEN 
 
0.0987**   0.1520*** 
 
0.1660*** 
  
 
(0.0438)   (0.0431) 
 
(0.0320) 
INCOME MOBILE 
 
0.0313**   0.0383*** 
 
0.0265*** 
  
 
(0.0137)   (0.0142) 
 
(0.0102) 
R&D 
 
0.3120***   0.2500* 
 
0.4010*** 
  
 
(0.1050)   (0.1290) 
 
(0.0953) 
CONSTANT 0.0056 -0.0489* -0.0071 -0.0655** 0.0285 -0.0203 
  (0.0271) (0.0279) (0.0284) (0.0292) (0.0249) (0.0242) 
Industry-FE       
N 1,299 1,299 1,275 1,275 1,104 1,104 
R² 0.070 0.097 0.065 0.097 0.071 0.152 
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4.5. Conclusion 
While it is well-known that MNEs use different tax planning strategies to reduce 
their tax burden, there is less knowledge about how public disclosure affects the scope of 
international tax avoidance. Therefore, the aim of our study is to provide new insights 
into the relationship between public disclosure of group structures of U.S. MNEs and tax 
aggressiveness. Hereby, we also consider the influence of other well-established 
determinants of (international) tax planning. 
We analyze the effect of public disclosure on the attitude of tax aggressiveness by 
taking into account the phenomenon that several companies removed a substantial 
number of subsidiaries from their Exhibit 21 between 2007 and 2012. Our study 
identifies more than 30 U.S. MNEs that reduced more than 50 % of their significant 
foreign subsidiaries from publicly disclosed financial filings. In an empirical analysis, 
we compare the scope of tax avoidance of these firms with the tax avoidance behavior of 
U.S. based MNEs that did not change their disclosure of foreign subsidiaries.   
Our empirical results reveal a significant effect of reduced public disclosure on 
international tax avoidance. Those firms with vanishing foreign subsidiaries in their 
Exhibit 21 become more tax aggressive after changing their public disclosure behavior 
compared to firms that did not change their public disclosure attitude. In addition, our 
results confirm the influence of well-known strategies of tax avoidance of MNEs, such 
as the use of tax havens and other profit-shifting opportunities. Our findings are 
supported by a series of robustness tests, applying different diminishing definitions and 
tax avoidance measures.  
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Our study contributes to the recent debate on base erosion and profit-shifting. 
From our analysis, we conclude that tax aggressiveness and public disclosure are related. 
Therefore, our results suggest that publicly disclosed country-by-country information 
could influence MNEs’ tax avoidance behavior.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Foreign ETR (txfo + txdfo) / pifo 
Foreign Current ETR txfo / pifo 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi – esub) 
SIZE log (at) 
PROFITABILITY pi / at 
CAPINT ppeveb / at 
LEV dlc / at 
NOL 
Dummy variable, which equals one if there was a 
decrease in tlcf from fiscal year t-1 to fiscal year t 
HAVEN 
Number of tax havens in which the group has subsidiaries 
scaled by total number of countries in which the company 
operates  
INCOME MOBILE 
Dummy which is one if the SIC Codes of the parent is: 
283, 357, 367, 737, or 738 
R&D xrd / at 
DIMINISHING 
Dummy, which is one if the number of subsidiaries has 
declined by > 50 % between 2007 and 2012 and (i) ≥ 10 
subsidiaries are diminished and (ii) firm does not belong 
to the top 5 % firms in decreasing sales 
D2012 Dummy variable which equals one for year 2012 
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Appendix 2: Investor Relations Letter 
 
Information Request 
 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
I am an accounting student at the University XXXXXXXXXXXXX.. My thesis 
focuses on the disclosure of significant foreign subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 of SEC 
Form 10-k. I have recognized that [company name] has significantly reduced the 
number of foreign subsidiaries disclosed in Exhibit 21 in year 20XX. 
I hope that you might be able to answer several questions regarding this reduction: 
1. Why was there a decrease in the number of foreign subsidiaries from 20XX 
to 20XX? For example, has [company name] voluntarily disclosed more 
subsidiaries in Exhibit 21 than required by Item 601 of SEC Regulation S-K 
(§229.601) or has [company name] been involved in M&A activities? 
2. If [company name] changed its disclosure policy, what factors did the 
company consider in making this change? 
Thank you very much in advance for your help!  
Your support in this matter would be greatly appreciated. If you have any further 
questions or prefer to send your answer via email, you can contact XXXXXXXXXX. 
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